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Abstract
Why are some minorities in the Middle East less inclined to support democratization or
political liberalization efforts? Here, I examine if and how minorities differ in their support for
democratization from the majority groups in the Middle East. I will analyze why some minorities
prefer to support authoritarian regimes over supporting democratization. I examine how the
religion of a minority affects its preference for regime type. I will also examine how historical
backgrounds and international patronage affects those preferences. I will identify two historical
moments in the Middle East that played a role in shaping those preferences: the post-World War
One mandate period moving into the post-independence period, and the Arab Spring.
Based on a Single Case Study of Muslim Alawites in Syria, I will argue that the French
Mandate period played a major role in enticing some minorities in the Middle East, in this case
the Alawites in Syria, to support authoritarian regimes. My research will first analyze the postWWI colonial period and the effects of the mandate policies on minorities, then move to the
post-independence period and build a correlation between those policies and the support of
minorities for authoritarianism in Syria all the way to the Arab Spring period.
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Introduction
One of the characteristics of the Middle East region is the presence of several ethnic and
religious minorities across the region. The political role of minorities in the region went through
changes after WWI, and the final agreements as drafted during the Paris Peace Conference of
1919-1920. Those final agreements resulted in placing parts of the region under mandate. The
mandate period had a tremendous effect on the build-up of authoritarianism in the region through
the support of minorities to assume ruling power over other majorities. The main question which
this research will be addressing is why some minorities in the Middle East are more likely to
support authoritarianism.
The endeavor for democracy has been an ongoing struggle for the people of the region.
However, seldom the desires of the people were matched with the practices of the ruling
regimes. Many observers attribute such to the religion of the majority in the region, Islam. But
the demand by the masses for human rights, political liberalization, and a democratic
government in the region during the 1980’s and 1990’s paints another picture. It leaves no doubt
that the claim that Islam and Muslims do not oppose democracy in general (Anderson, 1995).
We should keep in mind that a majoritarian Muslim Sunni Arabs represent most of the
population in the region while other religious and ethnic minorities live in the region or co-exist
alongside the majoritarian Muslim Arab population.
The purpose of this research is to study the position of religious minorities towards the
process of democratization and political liberalization. My research will attempt to find answers
why those minorities support authoritarianism in place of democratization by studying the
French Mandate period in Syria and the effect of the Mandate policies on the attitude of
minorities in Syria. In addition, this research will address the ramifications of those policies and
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attitude in the post-independence era in Syria. Through this research, I will examine 2 periods in
the history of Syria as a nation-state. In Chapter Two, I will address Syria under the French
Mandate from 1923 to 1943. This chapter will analyze the relationship between the French
Mandate as an authority and the minorities in Syria and how related policies affected the attitude
of those minorities, specifically, the Muslim Alawite later in time. In summary, Chapter Two
will be looking at the causes. In Chapter Three, I will cover the period from the Syrian
Independence in 1943 to the Arab Spring in 2011. Here, I will look at the creation of the
authoritarian regime in Syria and look at the effects of such on both the minorities and the
majority. In summary, Chapter Three will be looking at the results.
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Literature Review
Democracy: An Ongoing Process
Before this research goes into details about democratization, or the factors that drives
minorities away from political liberalization and more into supporting authoritarianism, it is
imperative to define democracy and its processes especially where it relates to the region, the
subject of this research. When we think of democracy, the first basic idea that we might associate
with it, is freedom. For a long time, the notion of freedom was a centric point in mankind’s
struggle. Thomas Hobbes, who can be called the father of liberalism, drew a straight line
between liberalism and democracy. Although Hobbes noted that democracy was an imperfect
system, in his Philosophical Rudiments of 1651, Hobbes advocated it and established two
essential conditions: First, there must be an agreement to accept the will of the majority, and
second is also an agreement, but this time to appoint regular times and places for assembly and
discussion (Apperley 1999).
Applying those two conditions to our time, this means democracy can be practiced
through elections that are set in dates and times where people can express their opinions by
electing representatives who shall meet in set dates and places to represent the will of their
voters. In that context, the process of democratization will require people to agree on erecting
appropriate institutions where democracy can be exercised such as a government, a parliament or
house of representatives. In addition, the people should accept the rule of the majority during
those meetings, a majority that can only be established through free elections as a representation
of the people’s autonomy or self-governing. The next dialogue will bring us to the dilemma of
whether this form of government is made “For” the people or “By” the people. Some might
wonder what the difference is since the concept here might be the same (Spitz 1979). However,
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there can be a big difference with a government “For” because it can always produce a struggle
depending on how you define the “For”, while a government “By” can produce less struggle
since it was the make of a majority. Abraham Lincoln thought to resolve this dilemma in his
Gettysburg address by advancing the concept of a "government of the people, by the people, for
the people" (Epstein 2011). Why bring this dilemma right now? The answer is to help us
understand how democracy, although an ancient concept, is still an ongoing process and struggle
for mankind, and in that context, the Middle East region is not an exception to this idea. As a
result, we see constitutions change, laws erected or amended in search of a better democracy, a
more representative democracy. This will turn out to be a real challenge in the case of the Middle
East.
Democracy in the Middle East
Democracy can be described as the antidote to authoritarianism, and in that pretext, it is
not easy to discuss democracy in the Middle East at least from a historical point of view. It is
imperative to discuss the progress/dynamics of democracy in the Middle East in order to better
understand some of the underlying reasons why minorities were willing/or able to support
authoritarianism. Most of the states in the region were created or took shape in the twentieth
century, mostly during and after the colonial mandate period. Although few states were
established prior to the mandate period, still democracy was not a major characteristic of those
states. It is important here to distinguish between elections and free elections. It is also important
to distinguish between a true representative electoral system and between gerrymandered
electoral system. Even when we look at few states in the region that run elections as suggesting
this to be an application of democracy, we still find that those elections are tainted with one of
the aforementioned issues. In Lebanon, elections are conducted according to religion and on a
17

closed-list system that leaves no room for an independent to be elected. In Israel, elections are
devised in a way to cut off any room for the Arab minority to play any effective role in
governing. Similar examples can be seen in Kuwait and Jordan, where elections are tailored to
serve the needs of certain tribal or social cleavages rather than the mass. In Egypt before 2011 or
Syria, elections were a mere charade where the results are set even before the ballot boxes are
opened. Free elections do not constitute democracy and when they precede the building of
democratic institutions, they are more likely to produce instability and upheaval, especially in
countries previously governed by authoritarian regimes (Ben, Meir 2006). This phenomenon not
only leads to democratic decay but also reinforces situations where minorities continue to control
majorities based on rules or rights proclaimed or derived from the mandate period.
The Middle East and the Quest for Autonomy
Following WWI, both Britain and France decided unilaterally that they earned the right
as winners to divide and inherit the vast lands of the much-defeated Ottoman Empire. The Treaty
of Sevres (Figure 3) was the epitome of this mentality. Consequently, France took over Syria and
Lebanon (Figure 4) while Britain took over Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq. The term mandate was a
mere cover for a new colonial era. No colonial power ever had the interest of the native people at
hand, rather the opposite is true. The mandate authority had at its best interest to keep things
under control and to establish a long standing, steady, and stable reliant political system. Divide
and Conquer was the tool used by the mandate power in order to achieve its said objectives
(Neep 2013). France made sure to disproportionally represent Syrian minorities such as
Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, and Christians in the colonial army in order to control the Sunni
Majority (Neep 2013).
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Here, it is important to analyze how the people in the Middle East region interacted with
the idea of autonomy or independence as a path to democracy in order to understand why
minorities in the region developed their support to authoritarianism, one can only expect with a
region with such a rich historical background to have a lot to do with democracy and
democratization. However, this is a region that rarely controlled its own fate, and ultimately
empires, major powers and international patrons always had the last word when it came to draw
the type of political structure or government in the region. Through history the Middle East
region was a playground of influence for major empires, from the pharaohs of Egypt, and all the
way up to the Ottoman Empire. Those empires were shortly replaced by British and French
occupation or mandate systems. All those empires were strange to the population of the region,
still they were able to exercise power and governance over the region and its population. It is
important to keep in mind that democracy was not practiced in those empires or most of the
world prior to the 20th century. Thus, we cannot really discuss democracy or any of its
components in the Middle East prior to the twentieth century, this puts us in direct contact with
the mandate period especially in Syria.
Minorities who were always part of that rich history did not have to deal with the issue of
democracy prior to the twentieth century for the concept itself was not relevant on all levels
whether it was minorities, majorities, or even religion. Come the twentieth century, the situation
began to change, while departing from WWI independence movements were on the rise and the
quest for autonomy became to take shape. However, the few self-autonomous forms of
governments were installed by the British and were a form of traditional monarchy, in both Iraq
and Hejaz (currently Saudi Arabia). Those self-autonomous governments were shy from the
promises made to the Arabs during the secret negotiations named “Husayn-McMahon
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Correspondences” which occurred between July 1915 and January 1916. Here, it is worth
mentioning that prior to that period, nationalism was on the rise in the Middle East and that
movement did not sit well with the Ottoman Empire. This led to death sentences and massive
executions ordered by Jamal Pasha (Zachs 2012), governor of what was called Sham region
(currently Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine). Now, although Hejaz is considered a special place for
Muslims, we cannot associate the nationalist movement at that time to Islam, to Hejaz, or to the
Arab aspirations due to the “Husayn-McMahon Correspondences” (Karaman 2018), for many of
the nationalists who were convicted and put to death by Jamal Pasha were Christians belonging
to a religious minority.
The situation only got worse due to the conflict between the agreements Great Britain had
with the Arabs on one side and France on the other side, most notably the Sykes-Picot
Agreement between Britain and France, and although this agreement was not implemented but
still important aspects of it prevailed in the Treaty of Sevres (Karčić 2020). As a result, the
Middle East was placed under mandate by both Britain and France and divided accordingly
(Karaman 2018). Both Britain and France had long argued that self-determination in the Middle
East region would be a process rather than an event (Smith 2016). Britain was still living its
imperial glories between sea and land expansion and its colonial aspirations. On the other hand,
France wanted a bigger prize for its bloody victory during WWI, and both the Colonial lobby
and the Right promoted the idea of colonial expansion in the Levant. Syria and Lebanon became
the target of this policy while France was advocating its claim as a protector of Levantine
Christians dating back to the Crusades (Smith 2016). It is worth mentioning that Britain had no
intentions of keeping any of its promises to the Arabs that were cited in the “Husayn-McMahon
Correspondence” for two reasons. First, Lord McMahon himself agreed with Sir Edward Grey,
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the Foreign Secretary, that Husayn demands were according to McMahon own words
“preposterous” (Johnson 2018). Second, both McMahon and Grey agreed that pleasing France
was a priority over any other agreement or commitment made (Johnson 2018). Ultimately, all
promises made by Great Britain to the Arabs were completely ignored during the Paris Peace
Conference. In place, a two-party agreement between Great Britain and France, the Sykes-Picot
Agreement (Figure 2), came to light. New boundaries were plotted, and new nations were
erected. Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan were all the new fruits of this agreement.
During the mandate period, we can define the signs of free elections as a step towards
promoting democracy. However, we cannot really classify those baby steps as true democracy.
The elected representatives had limited power towards their voters due to the power of the
mandating state (Britain or France). As the Western colonization came to an end in the second
half of the twentieth century, the region was divided along arbitrarily drawn state boundaries
splitting the vast Arab community along ethnic, sectarian, and religious lines that led to both
interstate and intrastate wars, and conflicts in the region. This contemporary phase of history
looms large in the region, with an uneasy communitarian makeup of Lebanon, and razor-sharp
ethnic and sectarian fault lines in Iraq and Bahrain. There are religious denominations clashing
with one another in Egypt, and deep-rooted tribal divisions in Libya, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.
This baggage from the past is compounding the problems of the Arab world which is in the grip
of revolutionary fervor to bring about democracy and representative rule to the region with the
"Arab Spring." (Abbasi 2012). In other words, the masses are finally pushing for a plurality
system where the voice of the majority can be heard.
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Authoritarianism in the Middle East
Non-democratic regimes are not new to the Middle East per say. Historically, many
forms of ruling were applied throughout the region but what was common is the fact that those
regimes were unquestionable by any agency of government or by the people. Their subjects did
not have a say in their rise to power, elections, and freedom of political expression and if they
existed, they were limited. Come the twentieth century, the end of WWI marked a shift in the
political atmosphere around the world with more aspiration for democracy and selfdetermination. So, when the dawn of mandate shined on the region, people of the region endedup with little to no aspiration for a change. At the same time, the mandate powers as explained
earlier did not intend nor had the desire to promote democracy. What those mandate powers did
was entice and encourage tribalism. Scholars have defined tribalism in different ways: tribalism
has been explained as a quasi-biologized principle of social organization (Lentz 1995), political
coalitions (Barth 1953), ethnic or kin-based identities (Jabar and Dawod 2003; Charrad 2011), or
localized groups (Tapper 1983). Long before a mandate was established in the Middle East,
tribalism was a way of life. Based on the definitions mentioned above, we can safely conclude
that tribalism in the Middle East took many shapes and forms including religious and ethnic.
Although this research will not address the issue of tribalism, still we cannot ignore the fact that
the mandate powers used tribalism within religious minorities in order to promote authoritarian
in the region.
Minorities in the Middle East and Authoritarianism
The mandate powers used minorities as one excuse to justify the mandate system. France
used its historical relationship with Christian minorities or other minorities as a gateway to
establishing control under its mandate, paving the way for authoritarianism to rise as a unique
22

way for minorities to control untrusted majorities in the region. The claims of injustice towards
minorities during the Ottoman Empire fueled such cause. The legal and political order imposed
on emerging states during the interwar years of the twentieth century did not, alas, solve their
minority problems. In a few countries in the Middle East, it contributed instead to the rise of
what might be called majority problems (Dajani 2015). In simple words, a majority problem
refers to a state where a numerical minority controls all military and security institutions in that
state on the account of a majority group that poses a competing claim to indigeneity (Dajani
2015).
As Landis points out: “Following World War II, minorities took control in every Levant
state, thanks to colonial divide, rule tactics and the fragmented national community that
bedeviled the states of the region.” (Dajani 2015). The mandate system allowed/or more exactly,
enticed minorities to rise to power, thus creating this majority problem. The majoritarian system
of rules is defined as the way to determine the truth of a moral code of a society or culture. It is
the beliefs, frameworks, agreements, traditions, customs, and so on of the culture, as to be the
function of what most of the people within the culture think is right, valuable, permissible,
forbidden, and so on. That’s true simply because there is, by definition, no larger group, and thus
no group for which there is greater reason to identify as the one that sets the standards for moral
truth (Wreen 2019). Mandate nations did not show interest in transitioning the region into
democratization, thus the region witnessed the birth of many authoritarian regimes under one
type or another, such as military through coups or monarchies both absolute and parliamentary.
This is not to claim that mandate powers gave birth to authoritarian regimes by not establishing
or supporting democratic systems, rather to say that policies and practices of the mandate powers
reinforced certain attitudes within certain minorities which later emboldened those minorities to
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grasp to power through the establishment or the support of authoritarian regimes in the postindependence era.
Minorities may generally be expected to be pro-democracy, especially if they have
experienced marginalization in the existing regime, because they can expect to have a greater
voice and protection in a more democratic polity (Belge and Karakoç 2015). It is understandable
that the introduction of fair and free elections does not necessarily translate into greater decisionmaking power for minorities. Still, democratic procedures should allow greater representation of
minority interests and, prospectively, the means to negotiate some of their essential concerns. In
addition, civil rights and liberties which are generally protected in a democracy, for example the
freedom of speech and the prospect of outlawing discrimination, are vital for minorities’ need of
security and their ability to positively engage in politics. Other things being equal, minorities
may thus be expected to support democratization (Belge and Karakoç 2015).
But such elections might bring a different majority to the power and in a complex ethnic
and religious population, elections based on majoritarian rules can have negative impact on
minorities. There is a big difference between belonging to a political minority, such as a political
party, and between belonging to either a religious or ethnic minority. In the case of political
minorities voters can shift their votes from one party to another based on the agenda/policies of
one candidate/party or another. In the case of religious minorities, things are different, and voting
become more aligned with the religious beliefs of the minority. Add to this the fact that one of
those cleavages that will strengthen the loyalty to the religious affiliation over the loyalty to the
state is the economic cleavage whereby wealthy minority population will not favor any attempt
of democratization for the fear of losing its economic advantage (Belge and Karakoç 2015). In
addition to the economic cleavage, the mandate created another problem by promoting the
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concept of fear by minorities, this led to minorities pursuing power on the account of majorities.
Robert de Caix, a senior French official wrote just before the occupation of Damascus in 1920, in
a lengthy document where he proposed the division of the French mandated territories calling the
‘protection of minorities’ a ‘primordial task of the mandatory Powers’. France took on itself the
holly role of protecting minorities as a basis to legitimize its mandate. For that purpose, the
argument that France’s policy of ‘divide and rule’ was based on cultivating close links with
minority groups to offset the opposition of the majority becomes a valid rationalization (White
2011). The success of such policies necessitated for France to promote the concept of fear within
minorities to legitimize its mandate authority locally. For that, French officials found no in
exploiting the religious and ethnic division in Syria. According to the concept of securitization as
developed by the Copenhagen School that explained how it becomes justifiable for a staterepresentative in our case a minority, to securitize an issue or to present it as a threat to the state
and ultimately uses this threat as a reason to break from the norms or rules such as suspending
parliament or limiting political freedoms. In that pretext, minorities used the concept of fear to
portray majoritarianism as an existential threat to both the regime and the society that it claims to
represent (Dajani 2015). In the Middle East and specifically in Syria, the new legal and political
order put in place through the French mandate did not solve the problem of existing minorities,
on the contrary it contributed to the development of what can be called a majority problem. In
those states, as much in Syria, the state’s political and military/security apparatus were controlled
by members of an ethnic/religious group that is a numerically a minority in the country, at the
expense of a majority group with a competing claim to indigeneity (Dajani 2015).
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Research Design and Methods
Why a Single Case Study?
Qualitative research methods enjoy “an almost unprecedented popularity and vitality… in
the international relations sub-field”, such that they are now “indisputably prominent, if not preeminent” (Bennett and Elman 2006). Both concludes that this is true because of the huge
advantage which case study methods and techniques have to offer when studying “the complex
and relatively unstructured and infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart of the subfield”
(Bennett, Elman 2006). This research will show how a single case study analysis can serve as a
means of both explaining and understanding contemporary political science and international
relations issues. Analyzing issues such as the effects of policies on groups confine a diversity of
enterprises, this is why a qualitative study will permit the researcher to conduct an in-depth
analysis, something that cannot always take place in quantitative studies. It provides the
researcher with a better opportunity to conduct investigative research and explore new ideas or
concepts (Gerring 2004). In addition, the researcher will also be able to provide a more
comprehensive approach and anchor on the inter-relationships and causal mechanisms between
variables using the qualitative method (Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2005). Qualitative
studies are distinctly suited for policy effects such as the French mandate policies and its effect
on the Alawite minority in Syria because a lot of the variables or concepts remain abstract, such
as divide and conquer, mandate, concept of securitization, authoritarianism, or democracy. This
enables the researcher to “achieve high levels of conceptual validity” and a “detailed
consideration of contextual factors” (George and Bennett 2005). It will steer the research clear of
the possibility of oversimplifying variables, which is crucial in this research because the
variables that are investigated are difficult to quantify into numerical values. In addition, the
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variables should also ponder on the relationship between each other and in the significant context
of understanding minorities attitudes. According to Alexander and Bennett: “Whereas statistical
studies run the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’ by lumping together dissimilar cases to get a larger
sample, case studies allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a
smaller number of cases.” (George and Bennett 2005).
Although I believe that a qualitative and comparative approach is the most useful for this
research project, it is also of essence to discuss the limitations of such approach. By far, the most
significant challenge to qualitative, comparative research is regarding which cases the researcher
chooses to investigate. Comparative studies frequently focus on two or three cases, which permit
in-depth comprehension and discernment. However, this makes it more strenuous to apply
acquired results generally to a broader number of cases which could lead the way to erroneous
analysis of causal mechanisms (Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2005). Here I quote Jason
Seawright and John Gerring: “in case studies of this sort, the chosen case is asked to perform a
heroic role: to stand for (represent) a population of cases that is often much larger than the case
itself.” (Seawright and Gerring 2008).
In the field of Comparative Politics, the “universe” of case studies when it comes to
studying the Mandate period or its effects is particularly frail as there are not many countries that
have been exposed to a mandate or suffered from its consequent policies. This implies that the
researcher must be strategic when selecting which case studies to address or reference. However,
this poses the risk of selection bias (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2008). Selection bias is
usually unintentional and might happen materialize when researchers choose cases that may not
be best indicative of the entire population. Researchers can potentially choose cases based on a
variety of reasons, for example comfort of content, ease of use, egoism, or based on personal

27

referential, and this could usher biased conclusions. At the same time, the researcher needs to be
careful because while being attentive to selection bias, it would be unwise to go for total random
choice when it comes to electing studies. Randomization is equally bad, although it might lead to
unbiased studies, but still it will not yield any informative contributions because of sample size
(Gerring 2007; Seawright and Gerring 2008).
CASE SELECTION
Now it comes to the big question: Why Syria? The fact of the matter is that Syria
encompasses all the parameters to qualify as a suitable choice for this study. First, Syria was
placed under the French Mandate for about 20 years from 1923 to 1943, the time of
independence. First, we notice the independent variable in my research (Mandate) available for
analysis. Second, the Syrian population is made up of a big majoritarian population (Muslim
Sunni) and other several minorities both ethnic, like the Kurds, and religious, like the Muslim
Alawite, Christian Armenians, Christian Orthodox, and several other smaller minorities. This
makes an important component of the dependent variable in my research (The position of
minorities on authoritarianism) available for analysis. Third, Syria also suffered from a brutal
experience of being under an authoritarian ruling since the early 70’s onwards. An authoritarian
regime that was managed by a minority (Muslim Alawite) and supported by various other
minorities (Muslim Druze, Christian, Armenians, Christian Orthodox, etc.). This further qualifies
Syria to be a quintessential case to analyze and prove the hypothesis suggested in this research.
Muslim Alawite is identified as the case study for this research based on the longstanding association of this minority with the authoritarian regime ruling Syria since early
1970’s. This research will study the association between the French Mandate and this minority as
much as other minorities. We will look at the circumstances and conditions that favored this
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minority to control the regime in Syria as well as the various challenges that faced that minority
and its regime through the past few decades from its inception moment all the way to the Arab
Spring. This research will study the negative effects resulting from the policies enacted by the
French Mandate in Syria and how it led to increased reduced horizontal and vertical
accountability, nepotism, clientelism, and increased corruption. It is worth mentioning that
following the independence of Syria, there was an attempt for putting a democratic government
in place following the example placed by the French Mandate, however, this attempt was
crushed by an enlarged period of upheaval whereby between 1946 and 1956, Syria witnessed 20
different cabinets and drafted four different constitutions (Bou Nassif 2020). All this resulted in
serious democratic decay showcased by altering election laws, creating path dependence where
minorities’ and the elites’ existence and continued prosperity became dependent on the existence
of the regime itself. Another result was seen in the institutional layering where the authoritarian
regime of Assad created new layers through the party of Baath which became the only path to
power in Syria. In addition, scapegoating was another sign of democratic decay in Syria where
the verdict of treason, sedition, and disloyalty through the association with Israel and the
imperialistic dogma became a preset for anyone who voiced its opposition to the regime. The
end-result was poor representation that allowed the Muslim Alawites minority to hold its
authoritarian regime in place to-date.
Research Objectives and Related Questions
The main objective of this research is to attempt to explain why some minorities in the
Middle East support authoritarian regimes. This research will argue that the Mandate period was
one of the variables that led to the reinforcement of some minorities attitude towards supporting
authoritarianism. and the obstacles facing minorities moving towards support of liberalization.
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For that purpose, this research will study the case of Muslim Alawite minority is Syria. This
research will also address the negative repercussions of such policies and support in Syria post
the Independence all the way to the Arab Spring period. I will also look at the international
linkage to minorities position towards supporting authoritarianism in Syria. The final objective
of this research is to draw conclusions on how minorities in the Middle East can be engaged in a
full democratization process.
Hypothesis, Independent, and Dependent Variable
I argue that the political structure of the French Mandate in Syria motivated the position
of minorities in Syria towards supporting authoritarianism.
The political structure, policies more specifically, of the French Mandate, will be
identified as an independent variable while the attitude of minorities in Syria will be identified as
the dependent variable. This research will be assessing the attitude of those minorities during the
Mandate period and compare it with their attitude after the independence in order to show the
existence of similar trends that can be identified as a result of the Mandate policies. Although the
Case Study focuses on the Alawites minority, the data will look for a similar attitude by other
minorities in Syria.
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Chapter 1
Democracy, Authoritarianism, Religion and Minorities
Introduction
The main question this research is trying to answer is whether the Mandate period in
Syria affected the attitude of minorities which resulted in those minorities supporting the
existence of an authoritarian regime post the Mandate period. This chapter will serve as preface
to the case study knowing that the classification of minorities in my case study (Syria) is not
based on political affiliation rather on both ethnic and religious affiliation. Thus, it becomes
salient to look at some definitions, and understand how religion looked at the concept of
democracy.
In that regards, this chapter will look at the conceptual differences between democracy
and authoritarianism and how political scientists defined how a society can be determined to be
either democratic or authoritarian. This chapter will also look at how political science tried to
explain the complicated relationship between both democracy and religion. Later this chapter
will cover the relationship between minorities and both democracy and authoritarianism in
general as a gate to understanding the limitations of democracy in the Middle East. This will
allow us to better understand how and why minorities reacted in such a manner to the policies
implemented by the French Mandate in Syria which paved the way for those minorities to
support the rise, the continuation, and the success of an authoritarian regime in Syria.
The literature suggests that minorities in general are expected to support democratic form
of government. However, the existence of ethnic, religious, and class cleavages modify this
assumption. Belge and Karakoc relied on the data extracted from two waves of the World Values
Survey (WVS) to compare minorities’ and majorities’ support for authoritarianism in four
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MENA countries. According to Belge and Karakoc: “the data shows that religious and linguistic
minorities differ in their support for authoritarianism: Christian minorities in Egypt and Jordan
are significantly more likely to support authoritarianism than the Muslim majorities in these
states, while Muslim linguistic minorities such as the Berbers in Morocco and Kurds in Turkey
are significantly less likely to support authoritarianism than Moroccan Arabs and Turks” (Belge
and Karakoç 2015).
Democracy: The Conceptual Difference Between Definition and Practice
It is not easy to define democracy as it is a concept with a variety of potential meanings,
and it is not simple to grasp or define (Dalton 2008). By far, democracy can be the most
challenging form of government for both the people, their political representatives, and
politicians in general. When it comes to politics, democracy becomes a political form of
government where the governing power is derived from the people, either by direct referendumdirect democracy, or by means of elected representatives of the people – representative
democracy. Direct democracy is still used in matters of referendum on certain laws or decisions
and mostly in a parliamentarian democracy. Still the most common form of democracy applied
today is representative democracy, whether a small town or a huge country, elect officials to
enact laws and make political decisions on their behalf for the public good. Such functions
typically require an investment of time and energy that renders it impractical for the vast
majority of private citizens to directly participate in.
Democracy is more complicated than it looks, it is more than a set of constitutional laws,
rules, and procedures that determine how a government should function. Government is only one
constituting element in democracy that coexist in a complicated social fabric of many and
different regulatory institutions, organizations, political parties, and associations. This unique
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diversity is called pluralism, and its main function is to assure that the many organized groups
and institutions do not depend upon a government for their legitimacy, authority, or existence.
Diane Ravitch, scholar, author, and a former Assistant U.S. Secretary of Education, wrote:
“When a representative democracy operates in accordance with a constitution that limits the
powers of the government and guarantees fundamental rights to all citizens, this form of
government is a constitutional democracy. In such a society, the majority rules, and the rights of
minorities are protected by law and through the institutionalization of law” (Grant 2013).
Between Democracy and Authoritarianism
The proposition of non-democracy has been pervasive for a long time, noting though that
the forms of non-democracy have taken many forms. A non-democracy entitles the power to be
vested with one person or a group of individuals rather with the people. Monarchies,
dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, are all forms of non-democratic forms of government.
However, as the nature of states and governments got more complicated, so does the concept of
democracy and non-democracy and what constitutes conditions or functions under those two
distinct concepts. This point becomes more salient when we study Syria because the presence of
religious and ethnic minorities makes governing harder to address compared to standard political
party minorities.
The simplest way to define democracy is to say that it is a type of government or political
system ruled by citizens or members of a society. The level of democracy in that type of
government of society is determined by the level of power and authority entrusted in the citizens
themselves or their representatives, how much politically active are those citizens, and the types
of freedom allowed or injected in the governing contract of that society also known as the
constitution. Therefore, a healthy democracy requires four key elements. First, a political system
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for electing and replacing the government through free and fair elections. Second, a high level of
active participation by the people in both political and civic life. Third, protection human rights
for all citizens. Last, equal protection and treatment for all the people under the law (Peters
2001).
In a healthy democracy, the consent of the governed is essential for the success of the
government. Still, it is worth noting that in a healthy democracy, the people are typically
sovereign, for they are, through elections, the highest level of authority. In practice, the
government holds the power temporarily when elected by the people, however, the people hold
the power indefinitely (Peters 2001). True that laws and policies typically require majority
support in a democracy, still the rights of minorities are protected in certain agreed ways.
Different democracies offer different ways or level of protections for the minorities in order to
subdued or eliminate the tyranny of the majority. In an established democracy, the affair of
minorities protection, whether ethnic, religious, or cultural can be examined from two different
ideologies. First, the issue of minorities protection is about the identification of the relation
between the "majority culture" on one side and the "culture of minorities" as a relation of
possible enmity which, under unrestrained conditions, can usher to mutual social exclusion. The
second approach calls for the need to safeguard some specific cultural identities within the
context of a cultural pluralism, as beneficially important for preserving certain stability factor at
a macro-social level (Ratulea 2009). This is extremely indicative in Syria with the presence of
both ethnic and religious minorities. Add to that, the fact that democracy will be instituted when
a dynamic equilibrium exists between the different parts of the society (classes, groups, parties,
individuals) and the social whole. When the competing positions and interests confront legally
among each other and reconcile, they do not influence neither the interests of any minority, nor
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of the social whole. According to Ratulea in this case: “ The free and creative individual, civil
society in its diversity and legitimate political power adjust their relations in a rightful manner;
the person’s rights and liberties are observed, and the State functions according to the lawful
standards” (Ratulea 2009).
These ways can be certain sets of rules or laws governing the executive branch of the
government as much as the legislative. But in general, those ways include the ability to criticize
elected officials or representatives, in addition to the ability to observe all different processes and
procedures from voting to law making. It is true that one of the functions of the legislative
branch in a democracy is to practice the power of checks and balances on the executive as much
as the judicial branch practices the same checks and balances on both executive and legislative
branches. But the reality, it is the people themselves who holds the utmost power to exercise the
power of checks and balances on all aspects of the government.
It is essential in a democracy to keep the government on a constant rotation through fair
and free elections and on regular intervals according to the laws as prescribed and voted on by
the people. Elected officials do not have the power to extend their terms as those powers were
extended to them based on a contract with the people. Again, the idea that this power is
temporary and goes back to the people who only processes the indefinite power is existential for
democracy. In a democracy, people, groups, or political parties comes with different interests
and opinions. In order for a democracy to work, those engaged must have the will and power to
sit down and negotiate. It does not matter what type of democracy is in place, still all
democracies rely on the concept of negotiation and compromise. In addition, despite the fact that
the people have the right to question the decision of the government, still they cannot reject the
authority of the government. That been said, democracy is not a perfect system for it require a lot
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of compromise. Winston Churchill famously declared that: "No one pretends that democracy is
perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government
except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” (Haritz 2004). With the
French Mandate authorities not promoting the building matrix for a institutional democracy in
Syria, this discussion helps us explain why minorities in Syria became concerned with a
majoritarian rule which will be addressed in the last section of this chapter.
On the other hand, the concept of non-democracy is historically and widely known and
practiced. It does not matter what type of non-democracy we are talking about, basically they are
all the opposite of democracy where the head of the state whether an individual or a group have
total power over the government and the people. All four basic elements of democracy are nonexistent. Non-democracy is divided into various categories: authoritarianism, totalitarianism,
dictatorship, sultanism, monarchy, oligarchy, technocracy, and theocracy. Here, we will only
look at authoritarianism as it is the most essential and related to the discussion of this research.
Authoritarianism is a form of social organization characterized by the submission of the people
to an authority as well as to the administration of presumed authority. An authoritarian
government is marked by a highly centralized and concentrated power and which is maintained
by political repression and the ostracism of potential challengers whether it is an individual or a
group/party. Authoritarianism uses mass organizations and political parties in order to muster
people around the goals of the regime. Authoritarianism foreground arbitrary laws instead of the
rule of law. Election rigging and political decisions being made by a select group of officials
behind closed doors are a hallmark of an authoritarian regime. Opposite to democracy where the
term for elected officials is preset in the Constitution, in an authoritarian regime we are faced
with an indefinite political tenure. As we previously discussed, authoritarianism does not rely on
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brute force or the strength of its coercive apparati, rather it relies heavily on neo-patrimonialism,
divide and rule policies, and on repressing its opponents as well as bolstering its supporters.
Related to democracy, authoritarianism addresses democracy as obedience to the
“guardianship” of “wise” rulers whose authority defies constitutional checks, public criticism,
and electoral contestation (or at least fair contestation). By contrast, liberal notions of democracy
define democracy as civic freedoms that entitle people to a self-determined life and give them a
voice and vote in politics (Kirsch & Welzel. 2019). At a time where democratic government
encompass basic beliefs in human rights and freedom, non-democratic regimes especially the
authoritarian ones do not recognize those fundamental rights. Democratic governments look at
protecting those individual rights as a moral obligation while authoritarian regimes have no
interest in the natural rights of their people. But afar from that moral obligation, because
authoritarian regimes lack the secure foundation of natural rights, they unquestionably move
toward instability. This is a sharp distinction from democratic nations with vigorous civil
societies, which are more inclined to respect the people’s rights and protect individual freedoms
(Rubio 2020).
Under What Criteria is a Society Considered a Democracy or an Authoritarianism
To understand how the level of democracy can be measured in a nation-state is to
understand how non-democratic governance is carried on and, in this case, how authoritarianism
is practiced. First, authoritarian states are typically governed by authoritarian regimes that bear
crises of legitimacy and representation. The progression of authoritarian regimes is caused by
situations where legitimacy is subverted due to the inability of the government to solve various
issues that confront the society. In some situations, the inability of the government can cause a
crisis of confidence in the governing regime and consequently, rendering it vulnerable to
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uprisings and revolts. Such situations can force the government of the day or any incoming
government to resolve to be authoritarian in its measures and to ultimately concentrate power.
Later, that power will be vested it in a ruthless executive that might be efficient in inventing
solutions to the problems that face the people. This does not mean that such solutions in the long
term are valid or that they are designed to better the life for the people. In simple words, an
authoritarian state is one that is spawn by governance crises within a latent democracy (Magstadt
2011). The most important measure for how to differentiate between authoritarian and
democratic governance would be in the level of free elections. Different democracies can have
different measures or laws on how to approach elections or how to call representation as fair and
free representation. However, when it comes to authoritarian regime, elections appear as such
from the perspective of mass-election democracy that looks as liberal from the position of total
state program (Magstadt 2011).
In practice, an authoritarian state has some level of tension between the state and the
society that originate from the sustained supremacy of those holding absolute powers. Such
powers are based on military control and divide and rule policies in most authoritarian cases.
Opposite to democracies, in authoritarian states the control and the policing of truth by the
government is paramount. Authoritarian regimes typically rely on ignorance and desperation as
instruments to dominate and control the public. Within an authoritarian state, the judicial system
is designed in a manner so to advocate to the paragons and practices of the state’s security
apparatus. Such judicial system lacks destitute of due process of the law. An authoritarian regime
has an enormous level of authority that diminishes the individual freedoms, in particular those of
thought and actions. Such authority is mainly concentrated in one leader or a group of ruling
elites. This authority has some sense of anonymity and impersonality. In an authoritarian state
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the ruler or the person in power is considered the only source of the law and the Constitution,
and through this reasoning legitimacy is drawn and thus allows the ruler to present themselves as
the institution’s representative (Voegelin & Caringella 1989).
In addition to traditional authoritarian regimes, there has been a shift towards defining a
new type of regime as “Competitive Authoritarian Regimes”. The new terminology refers to
political systems that remain essentially authoritarian despite allowing meaningful electoral
competition. Such definition allows those regimes to occupy an ambiguous political space
between full authoritarianism and democracy, with its respect for political and civil liberties.
Levitsky and Way argues that competitive authoritarianism is a more restrictive category. It is
limited to authoritarian regimes that, despite their illiberalism, feature political competition
meaningful enough for opposition forces to view elections as a possible path to power (Levitsky
and Way 2002). This definition is crucial because we can argue although debatable that Syria
who routinely conducts elections despite its authoritarian nature falls within the category of
competitive authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way identify 35 competitive authoritarian regimes
that existed in the early 1990s. and they trace the divergent trajectories of these countries over
the last three decades: fifteen democratized, while nineteen remained competitive authoritarian.
Only one, Russia has regressed to full authoritarianism. Classifying this system of
authoritarianism as a type of “regime” implies a degree of permanence within its political
institutions. Here, Levitsky and Way argue accordingly that competitive authoritarian regimes
can last a long time. However, it is doubtful that the regular convening of elections must
necessarily lead to a democratic change (Levitsky and Way 2002). Again, Syria provides the
example to this theory.
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A valid question here is drawn, do countries in the category of competitive
authoritarianism have acceptable level of political stability to qualify as regimes? According to
Levitsky and Way, the unique attribute of such countries is literally the ambiguity and instability
of their political rules, which are constantly being negotiated and disputed (Levitsky and Way
2002). Leaders of similar type of competitive authoritarianism often find it to their advantage to
loosen their tight grip, open things up, all so to help legitimate their rule on the international
theatre. Many authoritarian regimes especially the competitive authoritarian one’s manifest
cyclical behavior by seesawing the carrot of liberalization with the stick of oppression.
An authoritarian state does not rely always on promoting fear with the people. The people
can support an authoritarian regime for various reasons. There is also dissimilarity in goals and
the existence of a powerful state society or ruler people relationship. There is also a high level of
centralization of power where political power is conserved, and it is also generated by an
oppressive government which abolishes or disbars potential challengers in the political theatre.
This description is directly connected to the status of Syria under the Mandate power,
where France built its Mandate ruling system by creating all the elements of an authoritarian
system starting from creating the office of higher commissioner who had unlimited powers over
Syria, to the creation of several autonomous regions based on the religion or the ethnicity of the
people of the region as a solution to the greater question of security in Syria. Although that
system provided certain benefits to the Mandate authority, but it only opened the eyes of certain
minorities on how an authoritarian system can satisfy more their demands for security (White
2011).
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How Political Scientists view Religion in Democracy
One way to look at religion from as a political system is to define it as an authoritarian
system of ruling. Religion requires an individual to completely surrender itself to a higher figure
or authority. Judging or doubting the words or actions of that higher figure is not an option. This
notion can summarize the turbulent and fragile relationship between democracy and religion in
the eyes of many scholars and the skepticism that usually goes when addressing the relationship
between religion and democracy. When looking at the relationship between the French Mandate
in Syria and the attitude of minorities, it is essential to pay attention to the religious aspect of the
situation. Syrian minorities were aligned over religious cleavage and not political. The struggle
was not horizontal between rich and poor, or between liberals and socialists rather between
Muslim Sunni and Muslim Alawite, or between Muslim Sunni and Christian Armenian or
Orthodox. France understood the complexity of the situation, and thus started its Mandate over
Syria by dividing Syria into regions based on religious affiliation.
To start, it is largely presumed in Western democracies that a democratic state must be
publicly acknowledged as secular. However, the stretch of secularization in countries which call
themselves democracies varies a by far from the ‘assertive secularism’ of France to the ‘passive
secularism’ of the USA (Watson 2011). Still, the tendency for democracy itself to be
undermined is a problem for theories of social creativity that includes the relationship between
religion and social order, including democracy. (Browne 2009).
For a long period of time, religion was not consequential to the concerns of political
scientists based on the belief that modernization leads to privatization, decline, and, indirectly, to
the departure of religion from the public space. However, these assumptions were not satisfied
and there was an ongoing intermix of religion with major political events throughout the world.
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Such intermix raises questions about the future of democracy. In the spirit of ‘militant
secularism,’ some scholars consider religion an anti-democratic force and an intruder in the
political sphere. Such viewpoints are counterbalanced by other more classical thinkers who
consider religion (mainly Christianity) as an imperative asset for democracy (Vlas and
Gherghina 2012). However, the opinion about different religions is not the same, where some
scholars define some religious to be more compatible with democracy than others. It is worth
noting that multiple studies stipulate that existence of convergent systems of values is a
necessary condition for the persistence of democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997;
2000; Lipset, 1959; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Rose, 1997; Weber, 1958). But even when the
support for democracy is robust, it is imperative for this support to be coupled with a compatible
value system, otherwise, democracy may not survive. As Inglehart argues: ‘Democracy is not
attained simply by making institutional changes through elite level maneuvering. Its survival
depends also on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens.’ (Inglehart 2000).
For the purpose of our case study, I will focus on Islam as a religion, being the dominant
religion of the majority in the Arab world in general and in Syria specifically, and its association
with democracy. In general, the deficit of democracy in the Arab world cannot be associated
with Islam as a religion rather to the political system that integrates of both political and religious
powers. Even though some Muslim thinkers promote the separation of the mosque and the state,
such a separation seems to be problematic. Such school of thought necessitate the dismantling of
the Islamic state in several countries mostly from the socioeconomic structure and culture of
most of the Muslim world where Islam still plays a significant role in governing those social and
cultural norms and consequently political ones too. Given that Islam regards God as the ultimate
source of legislation and political authority and as the giver of the laws to govern the entire
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aspects of social and political life, both at the individual and at the societal level (Vlas and
Gherghina 2012). Some scholars/schools go beyond that definition and identifies God as the only
source for legislation and authority. This is the reason why some scholars assert the notion of
incompatibility between democratic and Islamic principles.
The other school of thoughts acknowledges that Islam is divided into several sects which
allows a great diversity of views and interpretations of the Qur’an, its laws, and principles.
Moreover, the social, political, and economic circumstances of Muslim individuals and Muslim
countries can have impact on their attitude towards democracy. Based on this notion, some
scholars argue that Islam actually yields certain fundamental principles supportive of democracy,
such as the idea that power rest in truth, that justice and the rule of law are indispensable, and
that having an advisory system of administration is a requirement. Equally important is the idea
that Muslim society is made up of conscious individuals with free will and responsibility for
themselves and others, as well as for governing themselves (Vlas &andGherghina 2012). The
principles described are fully compatible with democracy, Vlas and Gherghina argues that: “the
Qur’an addresses the whole community and assigns it almost all the duties entrusted to modern
democratic systems. People cooperate with one another by sharing these duties and establishing
the essential foundations necessary to perform them. The government is composed of all these
foundations. Thus, Islam recommends a government based on a social contract. People elect the
administrators and establish a council to debate common issues. Also, the society as a whole
participates in auditing the administration.” (Vlas and Gherghina 2012). Thus, by rejecting
cultural essentialist explanations that wants to blame Islam for the absence of democracy in the
Muslim world, the above argument shows how the support for democratic ideals is universal and
Muslims are not less supportive of democracy as an ideal than any other religion, notably
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Christianity. According to the Arab Opinion Index (2017-2018) and based on surveys conducted
in the MENA region, 70% of the respondents disagreed with the notion that democracy is
incompatible with Islam. In the same study, 76% of the respondents responded positively to
having a democratic system of government (ACW 2018).
Minorities and Limitations of Democracy in the Middle East
The major reason for minorities to abstain from supporting democratization is the
problem of plurality where a majority defined by numbers can overcome the will or aspiration of
that minority. This minorities’ attitude and concern can be seen during the 1936 Franco-Syrian
Treaty of Independence negotiations where the High Commission received, and forwarded to
Paris and the League of Nations, communications received from representatives of several
minorities arguing against being placed under the authority of a central majoritarian government
in Syria. What is indicative in one of those communication is use of the term “minority” where it
stated:
“the populations of this government belong to different Communities, each one having its
beliefs, traditions, and distinct customs. Relative to Syria as a whole, they constitute
minorities that cannot and do not wish to be incorporated into Syrian Unity in any way.”
Not only this showcase the effect of Mandate policies on the attitude of those minorities,
but furthermore using the term “relative to Syria” explains that those groups did not consider
themselves to be minorities except in the case they were included in a unified bigger Syria, in
other words, when added to the majoritarian population of Syria (White 2011).
The literature suggests when it comes to both religious and ethnic minorities, they are
constantly concerned with the issue of representation and their voice not being heard in a
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majoritarian environment because often, majority leaders who sought to advance democracy did
not account for those concerns (Pföstl and Kymlicka 2015). Such concerns raised by minorities
were looked upon as a threat to democracy, and consequently such discussions were always
pushed towards an indefinite future where to be addressed (Pföstl and Kymlicka 2015). This
problem is a generalization, however in the Middle East region, the subject of minorities and
democracy becomes more complicated due to one additional factor which is the mandate period.
Citing the stereotypical French imperialist writings on Syria in the 1920s, we can detect the
rejection for the notion of a territorially or socially unified Syria. Robert de Beauplan’s 1929
work “Où va la Syrie?” states that “the Syrian nation is a myth.”. This is merely an emphasis the
religious divisions within Syrian society and conjecture an unapparent persecuting fanaticism on
the part of Syria’s Muslims majoritarian. This mentality was simply adopted in order to justify
the French mandate and presence, in addition to legitimize the administrative divisions the
French Mandate had imposed in Syria, as the only line of defense standing between Syrian
minorities and genocide (White 2011). However, the characterization of these groups as
“minorities” was new to a certain extent because the use of this term insinuated at the same time
the existence of a coherent majority in a state and the expectation of majoritarian rule. The use of
the term “minority” became relevant because being a numerical minority was what implied
certain groups were subordinate. Unhindered majority rule became a feared consequence that not
only will lead to the subjugation of minorities, but also to international impermanence leading to
the justification of the Mandate due to the presence of this unhindered majority. White elegantly
captured these concerns in a prominent French essayist’s attack on ‘Arabizers’ in Mandate Syria
in 1929:
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“What they want is an independent Syria where the 1,500,000 Muslims would subjugate
the half-million Christians. If this state of affairs came about, it would not only be the end
of western influence in the Orient: it would be the opening of an era of disorders and
massacres” (Dajani 2015).
After WWI Great Britain and France divided the region conveniently, especially with
France selling itself as the protector of the Christians in the Levant as a reason to promote,
defend and mostly justifies its mandate claims and power (Karaman 2018; Smith 2016). In the
case of France, this allowed religious Christian minorities to seek more rights and power.
Knowing that the mandate power has got their back, Christian minorities in Lebanon and Syria
grew bolder in their demands for power sharing despite the difference in numbers. France fearing
claims for independence or calls for democracy and free elections, pushed minorities to reject
such claims based on the concern of being overridden by majorities. France applied the concept
of securitization thanks to colonial divide and rule tactics and the fragmented national
community that bedeviled the states of the region. in Syria, the state’s political and
military/security apparatus were controlled by members of an ethnic/religious group that is a
numerically a minority in the country, at the expense of a majority group with a competing claim
to indigeneity (Dajani 2015). In Lebanon and through its mandate applications of the law, France
justified installing a completely non-secular shape of ruling on the account of democracy and
true representation of the will of the people. Later, this system found its way to become the law
of the land after independence. While in Syria, France applied the same tactics where minorities
Christians, Druze and Alawites, were enticed to support the mandate of France over the demand
of the majority for independence. It is extremely important to pay attention to the fact that while
we are discussing the example of minorities in both Lebanon and Syria who fell under the French
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mandate, both countries were a result of the concept of securitization applied by the French
themselves. Prior to the mandate, there was no such thing as the State of Syria or the State of
Lebanon. For 400 years both were part of what was called Bilad-el-Sham under the Ottoman
Empire. Going deeper into history this entire geographical area was only known by Bilad-elham. France took upon itself to artificially draw borders and erect states where historically none
existed. The Syrian state itself was not founded in response to the aspirations of its inhabitants
but rather in defiant opposition to the vast majority, who demanded the establishment of an Arab
state that would include the entire geographical space of Syria at the very least, and if possible,
to also include Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula (Farouk-Alli 2014).
France went one step further, to be specific France did not establish a unified Syrian state
at the beginning of its mandate period, rather France divided the Syrian region into two major
states with one state in Aleppo (northern modern Syria) to serve mostly the Christian minority
and another one in Damascus (modern day capital of Syria-center region) to serve the Muslim
Sunni majority (Figure 5). Both states were designed over the earlier Ottoman model (based on
the Ottoman vilayets). It is only in 1924 when those two states were united. France used that
division in order to be able to create smaller ethnic and religious mini states within the Syrian
geosphere. France created a Druze state in the area of Jabal Druze, with its capital Suwayda, and
an Alawite state along the Alawite territory (modern coastal Syria), with its capital Ladhiqiyah.
Autonomous districts were also established in the Jazira to serve Kurdish and Turkmen ethnic
minorities and in Alexandretta to serve its Turkish ethnic minority (Farouk-Alli 2014). The
erection of a separate states in Lebanon (Greater Lebanon declaration of 1920) did not also come
as an aspiration for the majority of its population, rather to satisfy the need of the Christian
minority for self-governance (Farouk-Alli 2014). Those minorities who came to power through
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the mandate, during, and beyond found no harm in applying the concept of securitization in order
to justify their existence and continuation in power. In those cases, the state’s both the political
and military/security apparatus became controlled by members of an ethnic/religious group that
is a numerical minority, on the account of a majority group with a competing claim to
indigeneity (Dajani 2015). Any demands for democratization or better representation by the
majority was considered as a threat to the existence of the status-quo. Those ruling minorities
employed certain strategies for legitimating their minority rule while presenting democracy as a
threat not only to the regime’s survival, but also to the security of the group(s) whose interests it
claims to represent. By prioritizing minority rights over political liberalization, those ruling
minorities summoned the twin perils of majoritarianism and sectarianism as an excuse for
pushing against any call for political reform (Dajani 2015).
Based on all of that, minorities considered such claims as a direct threat not only to their
existence but also to their financial, social, and economic system of privileges that was created
through the mandate period and beyond. Ultimately, minorities had no other choice but to
support and protect any authoritarian regime that will allow them to keep and prosper their said
privileges. The majority struggle for democracy was not seen as simply an attack on the
authoritarian regime itself rather an attack on those minorities and their collective benefits.
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Chapter 2
Syria Case Study-The French Mandate Period
Introduction
Most nation-states in the Middle East had lived for centuries as part of the Ottoman
Empire that was defeated and disbanded because of its loss after World War I. Although France
came out as a winner after World War I, still France was completely exhausted by the war in
both manpower and resources. As a result of that, France confronted many obstacles in finding
her place in the new international order (Eldar 1993). It is in that moment of history where the
new maps for the Middle East were plotted, and although the Middle East was not on the list of
priorities of both the French public and the French foreign policy makers, still the French PrimeMinister Clemenceau did not hesitate to oppose Lloyd George in 1919 regarding the “Syrian
Question” (Eldar 1993). Later, when the French Mandate power marched into Syria, the political
divisions of the country followed the lines of the provincial administrative divisions of the
Ottoman Empire. Syria did not have a definite territorial border. Syria in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was a geographic entity, known at various times as Greater Syria,
Geographical Syria, or Natural Syria (Fildis 2011).
This Chapter will look at the French Mandate period in Syria as a whole. I will start by
introducing a brief historical background followed by a discussion about the French politics in
Syria and its Imperialistic approach. Later, I will analyze the policies enacted by the French
Mandate authorities in Syria, mainly the politics of “Divide and Rule”. Finally, this chapter will
study the effect of those policies on the attitude of minorities, specifically the Muslim Alawite
minority and how the French Mandate sought to empower those minorities and why. In
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summary, this Chapter will be looking at the causes by attempting to validate the organic
relationship between the policies of the French Mandate and the attitude of minorities in Syria
towards supporting authoritarianism.
Brief Historical Background
Although the emergence of minorities in Syria took place within the framework of a new
nation-state and created by the Allied powers after the First World War, still the Ottoman millet
system played a major role in how the French understood Syria. In addition, the Arab national
sentiments empowered by the Sharifian government after World War I, had a direct effect on the
policies enacted by the France during its Mandate in Syria when it came to the fear of the
majoritarian Sunni population and consequently the push by the French Mandate authorities to
empower minorities on the account of the majority. This brief historical background will help
connecting the dots in the sequence of this chapter (White 2011).
On 30 October 1918, the Ottoman Empire accepted the Armistice of Mudros with the
Allies, and later signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920. Three years later the Ottoman
Empire signed the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 (Mather 2014). The Treaty of Sèvres can
be best compared to the Treaty of Versailles as to the harsh treatment of a defeated rival.
However, the Treaty of Sèvres (Figure 3) was far more punitive. The Treaty of Versailles did not
touch the integrity of the German mainland while the Treaty of Sèvres prioritized Allied interests
over the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire (Karčić 2020). According to the Treaty of Sèvres,
France was about to assume its mandate authority over parts of the Levant including modern
Syria and Lebanon (Figure 4). Five hundred years earlier, the Ottoman army was walking
through the Middle East, winning battles and adding vast territories to the young empire. At that
time, “Bilad el Sham” including modern Syria and Lebanon, became a property of the Ottoman
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Empire (Figure 1). For five hundred years, this vast land was divided into several geographical
governorates known as “Wilayah”. Each Wilayah was governed by a governor appointed directly
by the Sultan in Istanbul. The distribution of those governorates was dependent on the
geographical aspect of the territory with no attention to the ethnicity or religion of the people
residing in those governorates. One exception to that distribution was Mount Lebanon which was
offered a self-autonomy ruling accompanied with a tax levy and mandatory military service.
The engagement of the Ottoman Empire in WWI ended-up with heavy consequences on
the Empire itself and its vast territories and the Middle East was not an exception. Britain led an
effort during WWI to destabilize parts of the Ottoman Empire leading to a revolt led by Arab
tribes out of Hijaz (modern Saudi Arabia). Britain who for years declined all requests from Arabs
to support their plans for revolt and independence from the Ottoman Empire, made a 180 degree
turn in its policy after the Ottoman Empire took sides with Germany during WWI (Johnson
2018). As a result, a set of promises were made to the Arabs that were included in the exchanged
letters between Hussein ibn Ali, Emir of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High
commissioner in Egypt. Those promises labeled as the “Husayn-McMahon Correspondence”
included British support for the establishment of an Arab state in return for the Arabs revolt
against the Ottoman Empire (Johnson 2018). This was a solid attempt to establish the first Arab
state in the region, but in a direct contradiction to those promises, Britain was engaged with side
talks to France over the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire. The Sykes–Picot Agreement (Figure
2) was a direct result of those side talks between Britain and France. This agreement was meant
to be a temporary measure that intended to only create or sketch vague “zones of interest” in the
case where the Ottoman Empire collapse, both nations wanted to designate each country’s
military occupation control simply to avoid disagreements or conflicts (Mather 2014). However,
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history will show that this agreement was the building block for the Treaty of Sèvres which
ended up shaping the polity of the Middle East for the next 100 years.
It is worth noting that as far as Britain was interested, the Sykes–Picot Agreement (Figure
2) was never intended to reshape the polity of the Middle East, at least on the British side, this
agreement was a mere vague bargain with France so to organize territorial control. Although
quite controversial, some literature makes the argument that the Arabs themselves were not at
that time interested or showing any signs of homogenous polity, at that time their divisions were
overwhelming by the fact of their own rival factions, a sentiment that followed for decades to
come (Mather 2014). Two important notes here, first, is the non-coincidental fact that both the
“Husayn-McMahon Correspondence” (1915-1916) and the Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916)
occurred around the same time. Neither Arabs nor France were aware of how Britain was
conducting its diplomacy at that time. Second, Britain itself had no intentions of respecting its
promises to the Arabs for two reasons. First, Lord McMahon himself agreed with Sir Edward
Grey, the Foreign Secretary, that Husayn demands were according to McMahon own words
“preposterous” (Johnson 2018). Second, both McMahon and Grey agreed that pleasing France
was a priority over any other agreement or commitment made (Johnson 2018). Ultimately all
promises made by Great Britain to the Arabs were completely ignored during the Paris Peace
Conference. In place, a two-party agreement between Great Britain and France, the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, came to light as governing basis for the Treaty of Sèvres (Figure 3). New boundaries
were plotted, and new nations were erected. Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan were all
the new fruits of this agreement.

52

France and the Mandate: Colonialism vs Imperialism
Based on the literature explaining what Britain’s intentions were regarding the Sykes–
Picot Agreement from France, one would question in this case what Frances real intentions were.
We have already established that the Sykes–Picot Agreement was the building matrix for the
Treaty of Sèvres that laid down the legal framework for the French mandate over Syria. Did
France seek the mandate as part of a colonial mentality or simply for the sake of
preserving/showcasing its imperialistic power?
It is evident that the France favored the use of religion in order to structure its
relationship with various Syrian communities (Figure 6). This also allowed them, and their
Christian allies, to marginalize the (many) Christians who were not hostile to nationalism. This
policy suited the historic justification for French involvement during the days of the Ottoman
Empire, by that I am referring to the protection of the Christian communities. However, this
notion does not sit well with the secular nation-state philosophy of the League of Nations, and in
order for France to align itself with that philosophy, France gradually came to rewrite both its
present purpose and its past involvement in Syria as being the protection of minorities. The
concept was in any case becoming increasingly meaningful in Syria, as various institutions of the
nation-state took deeper root now. It also became an important part of the self-justifying rhetoric
of French imperialism (White 2011).
Political Science defines colonialism as the act that describes policies and actions of a
strong state that establishes territorial control over an underdeveloped country or nation, most
often accompanied by exploitation of the local population (Chumakov 2014). In principle,
Western European colonialism was initiated for pure economic reasons, the colonies served a
dual function. First, those colonies provided raw materials and supplies to the metropolitan state,
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and second, they presented a consuming market for goods imported for the metropolitan states.
Seth asserts that Edward Said in his 1978 text Orientalism adds an additional layer to
colonialism: “Edward Said’s seminal text Orientalism Said’s 1978 work provides a now
canonical reading of European colonialism through the conceptual grid of Self/Other; the
Occident/Orient (Seth 2001). By doing such, Said provided a more multiplex realization of
power, for Said power is not solely identified with bullets, governance or wealth extraction. Said
adds the element of production of knowledge to that mix.
On another hand, imperialism is defined as: “the projection of states’ power beyond their
borders is defined by interest and capture in foreign policy making and implementation” (Okon
and Ojakorotu 2018). Imperialism adds another layer to colonialism where the metropolitan state
is not only interested in the economic or exploitation, but in addition it aspires for additional
spheres of influence, protectorate’s position, and domination.
Despite decades of independence and self-autonomy, the world still witnesses episodes
where those metropolitan states, today referred to as foreign powers, continue to protrude their
interests and impose their preferences on the past colonies or territories. This recurring decimal
has led to the coinage of words like neocolonialism, neopatrimonialism and paternalism,
amongst others to describe the nature of the relationship between those territories and their
former colonial masters and their allies (Okon and Ojakorotu 2018). As an example, France
acknowledged Lebanon’s independence in 1943 after 23 years of mandate, decades after that, the
Lebanese still refer to France as the “Tender Mother”.
Moving forward, colonialism was not new to the Middle East or to France. True, Britain
was already in Egypt since 1882; Italy invaded Libya in 1911; but France had occupied Algeria
in 1830, followed by the occupation of Tunisia and Morocco in 1881 and 1912, respectively (Mir
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2019). In 1916, the French government became aware of certain plans for Syria developed by the
British. This triggered the Quai d’Orsay (French Prime Minister) to pass this information
immediately to the Comité de l’Asie Française which represented the colonial lobby group who
feared that the British would acquire an advantage in the Middle East while France was engaged
in the war in Europe. At this point, the French government, which had no territorial interest or
claims in Syria, found itself compelled to compete with Britain. It so happened that the envoy to
negotiate with London was Francois Georges-Picot, a member of the Comité de l’Asie Française
and former consul of Beirut. Picot had been a big advocate in the months before the war, trying
to get the Greeks to supply arms and ammunition to the Lebanese. He also was active in trying to
keep abreast of Syrian national sentiment before 1914 too, but after his precipitous departure on
the outbreak of war, the Ottomans acquired all his records and systematically arrested, deported
or killed the nationalist elite. In the event, this was to serve French interests in Syria very well as
events will show later (Johnson 2018). It becomes evident that France’s interest in mandating
Syria was more of an imperialistic desire rather simple colonial ambition.
French Mandate of Syria: The Abolition of the Sharifian Government
At the beginning of the mandate in Syria, France had four serious issues to deal with.
First, France came out of the war with diminished resources in both men and supplies which
reflected on its military presence in the Levant. Second, the strong British military presence in
the Levant especially in Syria represented a challenge for the French, third, the ambitious new
Turkish government under Mustafa Ataturk in north of the Levant. Forth and most important was
the newly established Arab government in Syria and the proclamation of Faysal I, son of Sharif
Husayn, Emir of Mecca and the leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, as King of
Syria. The issue of the British military presence in Syria was soon resolved with the withdrawal
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of those forces at the end of 1919 (Eldar 1993). However, the biggest challenge to the mandate
authority at that time was Faysal himself.
Between the end of 1918 throughout 1919 Faysal was treated by the French rather
positively, the objective was to gain his acceptance of direct French rule in Syria. This climate of
positiveness reached its epitome in January 1920 when both Faysal and the French Prime
Minster Clemenceau reached a written understanding. This understanding was later considered
by the French as a semi-agreement with a binding value (Eldar 1993). Nevertheless, this
understanding had very slim chances of surviving due to internal developments both in France
and in Syria. In France, on 20 January 1920 Alexandre Millerand replaced Clemenceau as a
Prime Minister. Contrary to the policy of his Clemenceau, Millerand showed a direct interest in
developing the French policy in the Levant and to be directly engaged in its formulation.
Millerand’s first order of business was to call for a halt to the friendly relations between Faysal
and France. The relationship between both parties took a downturn with the convocation of the
Syrian Congress in Damascus on 8 February and consequently the coronation of Faysal as King
of Syria. France rejected the Congress’s resolution as to be null and void and further Millerand
refused to recognize Faysal as King of Syria (Eldar 1993). Despite the efforts of General
Gouraud, the French Governor of Levant, to ease the tension between Faysal and Millerand, the
latter decided to take a more offensive stand and issued the following guidelines to General
Gouraud:
“The policy which the French government decided to follow in the Levant comprises the
following general military dispositions: In Cilicia, the French attitude should be strictly
defensive and enable the maximum economy of forces. In Syria it should tend to impose,
without delay, French authority and prestige, by breaking if necessary by offensive
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operations, the resistance and intrigues of Faysal's government ...Thus the major part of
the forces and the materiel would be concentrated in Syria in order to realize as early as
possible the occupation of Damascus and Aleppo. The occupation of Homs and Hamma
would follow.” (Eldar 1993).
Millerand had every intention to get rid of Faysal and consequently he directed Gouraud
to look for new leadership for Syria that would collaborate with France in accordance with the
spirit of the mandate. Millerand considered the committees of the notables in Syria as capable of
guaranteeing a republican regime in Syria both in its western and eastern parts, structured as an
autonomy but still under the umbrella of the French authority of the mandate. Millerand directed
Gouraud so to assure the neutrality and the non-involvement of the Bedouin tribes east to the
four towns, in the struggle with Faysal and his government. Ultimately, the only acceptable
option by the French for Faysal to survive as a ruler in Damascus was complete surrender and
submission to the French high commissioner (Eldar 1993), something Faysal was not ready to
abide by. The importance of those two policies, the reliance on the Committees of notables and
the sidelining of the Bedouin tribes will be discussed in depth later as part of the empowerment
of minorities under the French mandate.
Faysal did not give-up on diplomacy especially when he saw the French strike a ceasefire
with the nationalists in Turkey which freed more French troops to be used in Syria. However, the
diplomatic activity of the Damascus government gave rise to some concerns to the French
government. Those concerns forced General Gouraud to go ahead with his military endeavors
and on 14 July at noon, Rayak and Mualakah were occupied without a battle. Despite Faysal’s
protests, Gouraud decided to send Faysal an ultimatum that included five conditions for Faysal to
accept in conjunction with the threat to use force if those conditions were not met or respected:
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complete French control of the Rayak-Aleppo railway to be guaranteed by control of the stations
of Rayak, Baalbek, Homs, Hamma, Aleppo and the occupation of the town of Aleppo; the
abolition of conscription to the Sharifian army; the acceptance of the French mandate; the use of
the Syrian currency to be decided upon by the French, and the punishment of those guilty of
hostilities against the French administration (Eldar 1993), Gouraud fixed midnight 18 July as the
deadline for fulfilling these conditions, and all the conditions would have to be accepted by
Faysal in principle before 18 July and carried out not later than 31st of July at midnight.
Khan Maysalun where Sharifian forces had been fortified was attacked on the morning of
July 24th by the French forces led by General Goybet. The battle lasted for eight hours, and the
Sharifian army was no match to the French tanks and aircrafts. Consequently, Faysal's army
suffered heavy losses in manpower and armaments, including the commander of the army and
the minister of war Yusuf Bey Azmah, compared to only 150 French soldiers lost in the battle.
The next day, the French troops entered Damascus with no resistance whatsoever. A new
government headed by Durubi composed of pro-French elements was formed and presented to
General Goybet who later informed General Gouraud on behalf of the new government that
Faysal had seceded the throne. Faysal was immediately ordered by General Gouraud to leave
Syria within 48 hours, together with his family and entourage (Eldar 1993). Faysal had no other
option but to accept and he departed Damascus on July the 28th, marking the end of the Sharifian
Government in Syria. The importance of this historical moment rest on two notions, first the
association with the Sharifian government and the rise in Arab and Nationalist sentiments in
Syria which represented a serious challenge to the authority and legitimacy of the French
Mandate in Syria. Second, the fact that the Sharifian government was driven and erected on the
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notion of a majoritarian Sunni support in Syria, something the French Mandate authorities
addressed later by elevating its support for minorities within Syria.
France Mandate of Syria: Divide and Rule
When France assumed its mandate authority on Syria, the political divisions of the
country followed the lines of the provincial administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire
which consisted of a number of Ottoman vilayets (administrative divisions), thus Syria did not
have a definite territorial border. Under the French mandate Syria was subdivided into five parts
(Figure 5): Lebanon, including as its principal towns Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre; the state of
Syria, with the main towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus; the mountainous region of
the Jabal al-Druze, with Suaida as the principal town; the Sanjak of Latakia, with Latakia as its
principal town; and the Sanjak of Alexandretta, in theory part of Syria, but in practice separate
and subject to a special autonomous form of government (Fildis 2011).
The resistance to French control was the strongest within Faysal’s short-lived Damascus
regime. This resistance was built mostly from both the Arab political societies, dominated by
Iraqi and Syrian officers of the Arab army, and the wider populations of Damascus and Aleppo,
who were not happy with Faysal’s submission to the French. France understood that the success
of its mandate in Syria was contingent upon the weakening of the Arab nationalism. Based on
that France developed a plan that consisted of two elements: First, Syria would be divided into
segments in order to block nationalist sentiments or actions. Second, France would erect a local
Syrian government where France can rule the country through from behind the scene. behind
which the French would be in control. “La Syrie Intégrale,” or Greater Syria would be divided
and ruled as a group of states under the control of the French high commissioner (Fildis 2011).
The remaining question would be how many states there should be and on which basis they
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should be divided. France proceeded with its plan by applying a policy of divide and rule by
breaking down the Syrian territory along regional and ethnic lines. Arab nationalism was
proclaimed and practiced mainly by the Sunni Muslim community, consequently it was regarded
by the French as a threat to their mandate authority. As far as to the Christian and heterodox
Muslim communities (Druze and Alawites), they showed submission the political reality
portrayed by the French authority (Fildis 2011). Conveniently this fit into the French plan to
weaken pro-Syrian enthusiasts and Arab nationalists. The only friendly welcome extended to the
French from the Sunni community was restricted to the urban notables who were pushed aside
by nationalist forces during the Sharifian Government period.
To proceed with its plans, France divided Syria into a series of separate political units,
with the sole purpose of abolishing any thoughts or aspiration for a Syrian national identity
(Figure 5). France started by creating the two separate states of Aleppo and Damascus, which
included the districts of Homs and Hama. Both states were ruled by a local governor who was
supported (more-of controlled) by a French adviser. Next France created the Sanjak of
Alexandretta, with its distinct Turkish population, this sub-state was offered a large autonomous
administration in the Aleppo state. France did not stop there and in an effort at further political
and territorial fragmentation, France stressed the distinctiveness of Syria’s two regionally
compact minority groups, the Alawites and the Druze. So later in 1922, Jabal al-Druze region,
which was heavily populated with a Druze concentration south of Damascus, was declared a
separate sub-state under direct French protection. Next came the mountain region behind
Latakia, with its major Alawite population, France declared this region as a separate state under
direct French protection too (Fildis 201; White 2017). In 1939, France conceded the Sanjak of
Alexandretta to Turkey in a bid for Turkish neutrality in the event of war (Fildis 2011; White
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2017). This decision did not sit well with the Arab nationalists in Syria and remains a continuous
unresolved issue between modern Syria and Turkey.
France Mandate of Syria: The Empowerment of Minorities
The political system dictated by the French under the mandate was based on the policy of
division which was vital to the substitutive approach of the mandate by the French. The French
did not make or promote any policies that might facilitate the independence of Syria. On the
contrary, for decades they kept maneuvering around the idea, eventually they were forced to
leave Syria without a treaty under pressure from the British (Fildis 2011; White 2017). The
mandate authority did little to nothing in order to train local officials and imposed an artificial
and abnormal division between the different parts of Syria. One might assume that the main
purpose behind the entire notion of mandate is to prepare the Syrians to be able to govern
themselves. France had a legal obligation procured from Article 22 of the League of Nations
Covenant, which enshrined the principle of mandates. Clause 4 states that:
“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of
development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a
Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.” (White 2011).
However, in addition to not training local officials, France did not support or promote the
establishment of working and viable government institutions. Add to that the fact that the mass
divisions of Syria into many sub-states hindered the ability to develop a uniform administrative
system (Fildis 2011). As a result, Syria emerged after the independence in 1946 as a unified state
with very little experience of unity. The lack of the concept of unity was immensely needed in
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order to build a more vibrant social and political system that might, in the longer term, have
generated a democratic and stable society. We can attribute the process of political radicalization
in Syria much to the era of the French mandate, this legacy of which was almost a guarantee of
Syria’s political instability (Fildis 2011). The French Mandate sought to strengthen religious
divisions especially by distributing seats within representative bodies on religious communal
basis, by broadening legal autonomy in matters of personal status to minority communities which
had not previously been autonomous, and by awarding territorial autonomy to certain religiously
defined groups. That is, by expanding what remained of the Ottoman millet system as they
understood it. This policy was aligned with the colonial theories of Marshal Lyautey, whose
principle of association as opposed to assimilation had been developed earlier in Morocco.
Rather than attempting to assimilate Syrian society to French norms, the French Mandate
authorities would rule by association with that society, through native governments and laws
(White 2011).
In addition, France was able to hinder much of the Arab nationalist movement during the
mandate period. France was able to block the Arab nationalist movement or sentiments from
crossing the borders of declared sub-states with minorities’ concentrations. This created a huge
challenge to the Arab nationalists who were trying to expand their movement beyond the major
Sunni cities in Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs. Although those sub-states boosted the
morals and the polity of said minorities, still, in the end, those sub-states were not viable as true
independent states and ultimately were all reunited in modern Syria upon the end of the
expiration of the French mandate and beyond that with the independence. Nonetheless, minority
consciousness, was already reinforced through the Mandate period by a combination of
geography, religious differences, communal segregation and regional separatism through the
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French mandate policies and strategies (Fildis 2011). This would carry huge repercussions and a
damaging impact on Syrian political life for decades post the Mandate period, going through
independence all the way to today’s Syria.
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Chapter 3
Syria Case Study-From Independence to the Arab Spring
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we covered the causes and analyzed the literature that supports
the relationship between the policies enacted by the French Mandate and the attitude of the
minorities in Syria. In this chapter, I will look at the consequences of those policies on the
attitude of those minorities, especially the Muslim Alawite and its association with the support of
authoritarianism in Syria.
As we have discussed earlier in Chapter 2, WWI brought a lot of changes to the region
including in Syria. Following the Arab uprising in the Arabian Peninsula, Prince Faysal Bin
Hussein marched into Damascus in 1920 where he declared the Syrian Kingdom with him as a
king. Faysal acted upon the British-Arab understanding as stated in the McMahon-Hussein
letters. Little he knew that Britain had other arrangements with the French (known as Sykes–
Picot) whereby France got the mandate to govern Syria and Lebanon after WWI. France acted
swiftly and was able to crush the Faysal’s militia, Faysal was forced to leave Damascus and
France officially commenced its mandate over Syria (Grainger 2016). Faysal’s defeat was
accompanied by a sense of rejection from the urban Syrian population who was not ready to
replace the Turkish occupation with a desert Arab occupation (Grainger 2016). As part of its
mandate, France looked at the region from a sectarian lens with an emphasis on the Maronite
Christian minority located in Mount Lebanon. Large portions of land were removed from what
was known as Syria during the Ottoman empire and added to Mount Lebanon in order to form
what was called the “Great Lebanon”, in other words the modern Lebanon as it is known today.
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This did not change dramatically the social texture of modern Syria, still Syria was a country
with a majority of Sunni ethnicity with few minorities such as Alawite, Druze, and mostly an
Orthodox Christian and Armenians who fled into Syria from Turkey after WWI massacres. This
artisan of various religious affiliation will prove important later when discussing the political and
social dynamics (Grainger 2016).
The religious and the political intertwine in all sectarian conflicts and the violent
conflagration in Syria is no exception. However, sectarianism as an explanatory paradigm that is
extremely limited; it provides a monolithic reading of a complex phenomenon with a wellestablished historical pedigree. The Alawite division of the Shiite faith crystallized in the tenth
and eleventh centuries as a mixture of various Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs and practices.
The nascent Baath Party was instrumental in the Alawite rise to power. Many of the
Syrian religious minorities found the Party appealing because it advocated a secular, socialist
political system that held the promise to free them from socio-economic discrimination and
minority status. Far more important than the Baath Party, the Army was the other national
organization that contributed directly to the Alawi ascent. Several factors contributed to the overrepresentation of Alawites in the Army. First, the French had encouraged minority recruitment to
counter the nationalist tendencies of the Arab-Sunni majority. Second, minorities came from
poor backgrounds and were attracted by the economic opportunities and social advancement
offered by a career in the Army and third, Sunni urban elites avoided military service and
considered the army a place for the socially undistinguished. Coming into power in November
1970, Hafiz al-Asaad single mindedly constructed centers of power around Alawi sectarian
groupings, especially in the army, relying heavily on his officer faction, whose core members
were from his immediate family and close relatives, extending to include members of his tribe
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and then others from the Alawi community at large. Non-Alawites were not entirely excluded,
and Sunni officials were also placed in high positions. (Farouk-Alli 2014). We should keep in
mind that all those factors were strongly associated with the empowerment of minorities by and
through the French Mandate in Syria. The advancement of minorities in government and army
positions was merely a native policy to the Mandate period, alienation of the majoritarian Sunni
was also another aspect of the Mandate empowerment of minorities.
In June 2000, Bashar al-Asaad succeeded his father as the President of Syria, despite high
hopes that the young President would transition Syria into a 21st century democracy, those hopes
quickly crashed when Bashar used military force in 2011 to subdue popular demands for more
freedom and both social and political reforms. Eventually, Syria dove into a brutal civil war that
continues to-date. Since the independence and through the recent civil war, minorities in Syria
constantly supported the authoritarian regime. This raises a valid question about the reasons why
minorities in Syria acted in such a manner.
The Independence and the Rise of the Ba’ath Regime
Fast forward to 1946 where Syria was recognized as an independent state on the first of
January of that year. It took the French two years for their last soldier to leave Syria on April 17
of 1946. The new republic and its first democratic elected government did not last long.
Following the 1948 defeat by the newly established Jewish state in Palestine, the head of the
army Colonel Husni Zaim revolted against the political establishment and arrested the freely
elected president Shukri al-Quwatli. Al-Quwatli was exiled and Zaim proclaimed himself the
new president of Syria. The dawn of consecutive revolts just started, Zaim only lasted 4 months
before he was shot and replaced by another colonel and then another. Meanwhile various
political parties were in the formation with el-Ba’ath party adopting a social and a Pan-Arab
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unification agenda. After a failed unification with Egypt in 1958, el-Ba’ath party led another
coup and resumed control of Syria. But with several factions within the party itself, it is only in
1970 when Hafez el-Assad was able to lead another coup and assume total control of the party
and the government in Syria (Sadowski 1991).
Social Structure in Syria During the Ba’ath Regime
Prior to the rise of Ba’ath in power, most of the Syrian economy was a form of free
enterprise, with artisan and small industrial and commercial infrastructure located in major cities
mainly Damascus and Aleppo. When it came to the majority of Syria which is rural and agrarian
area, 82 percent of the population did not own land (Ahsan 1984). On the other hand, the
diversified nature of the population created a certain kind of uncertainty. This uncertainty arises
from the division of Syrian society by vertical cleavages along religious and ethnic lines, as well
as by horizontal cleavages along socioeconomic and class lines. The Syrian society is best
described as divided between landlords and tenants, between urban dwellers and rural peasants,
and between a Sunni elite and minority groups (Collelo 1988). The Ba’ath revolution brought
with it major changes to the structure of the economy. Syria is made-up of mostly a majority
Muslim Sunni amounting to 85 percent of the population while Muslim Alawite, Christian
Armenians, Christian Orthodox, and Druze represents the remaining 15 percent of the Syrian
population. When Hafez al-Assad assumed power in the 1970, he was faced with a serious
challenge being of Alawite minority origin. As a result of riots in 1973 in major Sunni cities such
Homs and Hamah demanding to declare Islam as the official religion of the State, the
constitution was amended so that the President should be Muslim while declaring that the
Alawite minority is to be considered as part of the Muslim faith against the beliefs of the Sunni
majority (Collelo 1988). This was a blatant maneuver to strengthen the empowerment of the
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Alawite minority represented by Assad himself following the same tradition established by the
French Mandate period.
The relationship between the regime and various religious factions was controlled by
mutual interest. Not only the Alawites minority but equally other religious minorities (Christina
Armenian, Christian Orthodox, Druze, etc.) found in the Ba’ath regime a refuge and a security
against the ruling of the Sunni majority. Of course, there was this conflict between the nonsecular beliefs of the Ba’ath party and the Sunni majority. The state made sure that religious
establishment were kept under the control of the government. The Mufti of Syria and the
Minister of Religious Affairs were both appointed by the President of the Republic, consequently
the official religious message related to the issues of Islam was kept under control. As expected
in an authoritarian regime, freedom of speech, in specific the religious freedom of speech, was
non-existent. On the other hand, religious figures representing the minorities were completely
supportive of the regime and Assad in specific. The continuous mistrust of the Ba’ath regime in
the Muslim majority resulted in a wide-spread discrimination when it came to public offices, but
mostly when it came to sensitive military and security posts. Those posts were kept exclusive for
individuals of minorities who can be trusted and whose loyalty was not under question. Few
exceptions occurred, but the decision making was always kept in the hands of those with
minorities roots. This was nothing new to Syria, decades earlier, the French utilized the same
system to alienate the majority from the government and the military by heavily relying on
individuals from within minorities (White 2011).
The distribution of wealth was a non-secular aspect of the Syrian population with a
concentration of tradesmen in the larger cities and landowners in the rural areas. Even after the
Ba’ath party assumed power and land reform laws were passed, still landowners associated with
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the regime and the party were able to maintain their status. Tradesmen were mostly of the Sunni
majority and the Assad knew how to maintain their loyalty by allowing them to work and
prosper. Assad proved to be a mastermind when it came to applying neo-patrimonialism in order
to gain loyalty of people around him, a policy that will prove to be vital for the survival of the
regime during the 1982 uprising and something his son and successor Bashar will prove to lack
in the future. But the marking phenomena which will prove vital to the regime later during in the
seventies coming into the eighties was the evolution of a true upper middle class made of small
merchants and commercial class who made a small fortune in the import-export business as well
as artisans and shop owners with flourishing business, add to that the white collar who were
office employees (Ahsan 1984). This new class thrived through the seventies and eighties and
later will prove also to be essential to the survival of the regime during the 1982 uprising.
The 1982 Uprising
The 1982 events are strongly associated to the argument of this research knowing that not
only the entire Alawites minority supported the crackdown of the 1982 uprising, but equally
other minorities showed similar support. The crackdown of the 1982 uprise was a true test to the
loyalty to the authoritarian regime of Al-Assad. We have looked earlier to the concept of
Securitization and its association with the policies of the French Mandate by promoting fear
within minorities in Syria from the Tyranny of the majority (Dajani 2015). True, France only
used that concept to draw legitimacy to its presence in Syria, but at the same time, we cannot
neglect the notion that those sentiments of fear were carried on by those minorities for decades to
come all the way to 1982 when the Sunni majority revolted against the ruling of the Alawite
minority.

69

Historians argues about how or why the uprising erupted in 1982. But the consensus is
that there was more than one factor involved in fueling the revolt. Which cause was of a greater
importance or influence does not matter really when looking at the results. The economic factor
cannot be ignored, the regime as stated before was more and more relying on the loyalty of
minorities who mostly came from rural areas. The Sunni majority aggravation was growing with
time especially when this new class was looked at as a competitor to the traditional Sunni
bourgeois. Add to that the fact that prior to the revolt, the Syrian economy was trembling
especially in the rural areas, severe drought had a negative impact on the household income, add
to that an influx in unemployment rates reaching as high as 30% (Aksu Kargin 2018).
At the same time, rumors were starting to echo health problems related to the Syrian
President Hafez al-Assad and his ability to control the regime. But the most undisputable cause
for the revolt was by far the growing movement of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB).
Embolden by the military success of its sister Egyptian branch in assassinating the Egyptian
President Sadat on October 6, 1981, the SMB was already having an internal conflict for years
between a more radical faction called “the Fighting Group of God’s Party” led by Marwan Hadid
who in 1975 sought to distance himself from the more mild SMB leadership. Although the SMB
leadership ousted Hadid form the organization and tried to distance itself from his group,
nevertheless Hadid and his group were gaining more influence within SMB itself (Díaz 2017). In
the spring of 1979, the SMB claimed responsibility for series of attacks on persons, usually
Alawites, and government and military installations. The most serious attacks occurred in June
1979 when SMB managed to kill fifty Alawite cadets at the military academy in Aleppo. The
regime resolved to crush the opposition and did so ruthlessly (Collelo 1988). By July 1980, the
Ba’ath government declared membership in the Brotherhood to be a crime punishable by death
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(Collelo 1988). Situation kept escalating with an attempt on Asaad’s life occurring in June 1980
until the peek was reached in February 1982, when the Muslim Brotherhood ambushed
government forces who were searching for dissidents in Hamah. The decision was taken at that
time to crush the rebellion, special Syrian military and para-military forces led by Rifaat, Assad’s
brother himself, and supported by armor and artillery forces stormed into the city of Hamah and
ruthlessly crushed the rebellion. The death toll was estimated between 10,000 to 25,000
including an estimated 1,000 soldiers. In addition, large sections of Hamah's old city were
completely destroyed (Collelo 1988).
It is worth noting that the Sunni elite either stood silent or supported the regime for
obvious reasons. On one hand some of that elite was already enrolled in the Ba’ath party and in
high position such as Abdul Halim Khaddam who was Assad’s right hand and holding the
position of Vice President at that time. Other senior army officers were also involved in
protecting the regime. On the other hand, the Sunni elite tradesmen were feeling comfortable
with the regime and its neo-patrimonialism treatment and did not want to risk losing those
privileges. Rifat al-Assad, Hafez’s brother played the major role during the military operations,
his para-military forces were in charge of storming the city without any regards for civilians or
innocent loses.
Syria and the Arab Spring
Both the 1982 events and the Arab Spring in Syria (Figure 7) needs to be looked at not
from a simple lens of an authoritarian regime trying to oppress its people, rather from the lens of
empowered minorities that historically were brainwashed by the French Mandate policies so to
believe that any attempt from the majority to change the rules of the game is an existential threat
to the existence of minorities as well to all the social, economic, and political privileges that were
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installed on them by France during the Mandate period on to today. In a sense, both the 1982
uprising and the Arab Spring are a culmination of those faulty policies installed by France, not to
say that those policies were directly responsible for those events rather an indirect catalyst for.
The 1982 uprising reinforced the Assad regime who remained in power until his death on
June 10, 2000. During an urgent session, the Syrian parliament amended the constitution by
lowering the age requirements for presidency from 40 to 34 in order to pave the way for Assad’s
son Bashar to be elected as the next President. Bashar painted himself as a young reformer,
however, this honeymoon did not last long. Soon Bashar was faced with many challenges on all
aspects, locally the economy was suffering not to mention the high level of nepotism that
flourished during his reign. His regional relationship were not in a better shape, lacking his
father’s charisma, Arab leaders moved away from dealing with him which created a long list of
enemies for his regime, especially with him moving towards friendlier relationship with Iran in
addition to his handling of the Lebanese situation and close support for the Hezbollah militia in
Lebanon.
Fast forward to March of 2011, and to the city of Daraa, Syria. When few school kids
summoned their courage and painted anti-government graffiti on the wall of their school, they
had no idea they will be instigating such a dramatic change to the future of their country, because
later, 15 of those kids were arrested and violently tortured (Sterling 2012). Outraged parents
sought justice through normal channels, there were few simple demonstrations at best, a
delegation managed to meet with the Syrian President Bashar Al-Asaad seeking justice for their
kids. After all, it was Bashar who promised deep reforms when he succeeded his father, Hafez,
back in 2000. The only problem was that on one hand, the Governor of Daraa was no one else
but Assad’s direct cousin, and on the other hand Bashar’s eyes were focused on what was
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happening in Northern Africa where Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were burning, and regimes were
trembling under the pressure of public uprising. Based on that and under the fear of his regime
being looked at by his people as weak and ready for compromises, Assad made the choice to
decline any request to bring justice to those kids. A decision, he will soon come to regret.
Different from other regional countries taken by the Arab uprising, Syria was different in
a sense that people were not opposing an authoritarian regime from within. Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya all were governed by an authoritarian regime, but those countries did not suffer the issue
of minority ruling like in Syria. For decades, the Assad regime represented an Alawite minority
ruling a Sunni majority. In principle and for decades, Assad’s father Hafez, relied on other
minorities, primarily Christian (Orthodox and Armenian), and on the Sunni Elite (merchants and
tradesmen) to ruthlessly rule the country (Ahsan 1984). This is why when the first Syrian
uprising occurred in 1982 in the city of Hama, the Assad regime was able to easily crush it using
severe measures and the utmost force and terror. When Bashar rose to power in 2000 after the
passing of his father, he gave the impression of a reformist. True, there was an economic boom
accompanied by restricted and narrow economic reforms that included opening the market for
private enterprises, private banks and foreign investments. But all of that, did not have a direct
impact on the majority of the Syrian population. Most of the wealth went to Bashar and his close
confidents within the regime and within the Alawite minority. Bashar made another mistake that
will later affect the course of the civil war when he sidelined his father’s old guard who belonged
to the Sunni elite. This time he will not find the Sunni by his side, the way they supported his
father during the 1982 Hama uprising. But one of the most important reasons why the civil war
erupted so fast and violent is Syria was the remnants of the Hama crush back in 1982. Assad’s
father crushed Hama in a violent manner which left deep scars and seek for revenge which will
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remain there for ages to come (Celso 2017). The massacre of the Brotherhood’s stronghold
inspired future generations of jihadists to avenge the memory of their slain brothers. Jihadist
revolts have a cyclical quality; the quest for revenge propels insurgencies that rise, fall, and
frequently resurface (Celso 2017). This will have a tremendous effect of the intensity of the civil
war in 2011. In addition to the socioeconomic aspect of the conflict, the conflict became a holy
war for the oppressed Sunni majority, while it became an existential threat for the Alawite ruling
Minority.
Nature of the Conflict
Although the Sunni elite did support and engage in the independence movement against
the Ottoman Empire, it is worth noting that this only happened after Young Turkey Party took
over in Istanbul and the conflict became ethnic between Turkish ruled Ottoman Empire and
Arabs in the Middle East. Still the Sunni majority did not fight for independence from the Turks
to see itself in 1970 under the ruling of an Alawite minority. The SMB were quick on catching
this. A pure Sunni movement with a huge emphasis on the Sunni dimensions of the religious
beliefs and association with the Sunni faith and the teachings. It is easy to see the SMB gaining
both sympathy and support of the general Sunni population in Syria, especially with the Ba’ath
Party trying to put emphasis on its non-sectarian doctrine not to mention its support by mostly
non-Muslim minorities.
We have discussed earlier how Assad brilliantly used neo-patrimonialism, which is a key
strategy of authoritarian rulers, to gain not only the loyalty of his own religious faction, the
Alawites, but also to capture the loyalty of a certain Sunni elite. However, this did not mean that
he gained the compassion of the majority of the Sunni population who were not classified as elite
and did not benefit from being close to the regime. Politically, the Assad regime had zero faith in
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the Sunni population. Consequently, all major government positions both political and security
were offered to party supporters who typically had minority background whether Alawite or
Christian but also from rural areas. Major cities with a Sunni majority were discriminated
against, and on all levels, Sunni were pushed aside. This discrimination ran down to the minor
details of daily life, in schools, colleges, workplace and government, Sunni were not trusted, and
were always topped by a minority person. That Sunni majority did not accept willingly the fact
that minorities from rural areas took over all aspect of government siding all Sunni based on
religious discrimination and due to lack of confidence in their loyalty to the Ba’ath Party and to
the Assad regime.
If we think of Clausewitz and his notion about logic of strategy: “No one starts a war – or
rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends
to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” (Fleming 2004). In the Syria 1982
uprising case, SMB definitely had in its mind what they wanted to achieve from the revolt,
however they did not think the how. There is no doubt that SMB underestimated the response of
the regime following their scattered attacks, nor they had a clear strategy governing their actions
and its results. Even if we look at the Egyptian example, Egyptian Jihad were able to assassinate
the President himself, yet the regime remained intact. It is doubtful how massive of a revolt the
SMB were thinking off based on the events at that time. On the side of the regime, the strategy
was clear, to remove any imminent threat to the regime. Although the immediate goal was
achieved, however the long-term strategy was set to fail. The regime did not learn from the
lessons regarding oppressing a majority of its population and how its brutality against civilians
might fire back in the future. This will prove right in 2011 when the new uprising erupted and
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this time with different geopolitical atmosphere and different international linkage that will bring
the country to a devastating civil war.
Unfortunately, the military solution remains the only conflict management strategy
governing the Syrian civil war to-date. Despite various attempts by the United Nations to
mediate a peaceful resolution, the situation remains at deadlock. Russia remains the most
influential actor in the Syrian conflict today, any peaceful resolution will require a stringent
amount of pressure from Russia on both the Assad regime and Iran, something Russia does not
seem ready to act upon now. As far as the United States, the Syrian civil war helps to illustrate
how the United States no longer dominates the Middle East (Phillips 2017). This does not mean
that a new regional system has replaced the unipolar order. Whether multipolar or bipolar, it only
implies that the region in general and Syria specifically does not represent a priority in the U.S.
foreign policy at the moment.
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Conclusion
The notion of a Syrian nation-state from a political point of view, did not exist before
1920. Syria was not an exception, if we study the political map of the current Middle East, we
can easily come to a conclusion that neither of the current countries was considered or called a
nation-state before the 1920. Since the dawn of humanity, this region was built on a tribal
concept and ruled by empires that mostly were foreign to the region and its people.
Why is this important? Because compared to other nation-states around the world, where
a single identity emerged around a geographic space with people sharing same traditions,
language, religion, or race, the Middle East in general and Syria specifically did not have any of
these. Syria as a nation-state was not erected based on the aspiration of its people or around a
single characteristic such as religion, traditions, or race, etc. Rather it was erected upon the
wishes of imperial forces and according to such desires. In a moment of time, lines were drawn,
and nation-states were created in the region including Syria without taking into consideration the
needs or the differences of the people of the region or its people. This is why, we see same
family names across borders between Syria and Lebanon, between Syria and Iraq, between Iraq
and Jordan, and between Jordan and Palestine, etc. The only way, France as a mandate power
was able to control this melting pot in Syria was through certain policies where minorities were
given certain entitlement, encouraged and supported to govern a majoritarian population that did
not show any interest in France or its mandate. The consequences of such policies resulted in
minorities fighting to keep control of the country after the independence by erecting and
supporting an authoritarian regime that ruled with an iron fist.
The Arab Spring proved that this iron fist cannot continue forever, and that serious
challenges are now facing this authoritarian regime. The key question remains how a minority or
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several minorities can be convinced that a road towards liberalization will serve their interests,
provide them with enough protection, and ensure they have a seat at the table in a majoritarian
democracy. This is if we concluded that the final solution is for Syria in specific and the rest of
the region nation-states to remain as they were drawn a 100 years ago. The international
community bears a huge responsibility in providing creative solutions for a problem that was
created by that international community 100 years ago. What is known for sure is that trust needs
to be built among the various components of the Syrian population. In addition, the conditions
leading to that rust needs to be identified and agreed upon. But most important, it should be clear
that this trust should lead to tangible benefits for all parties so all parties can have a shared
interest in the proposed solution.

78

Bibliography
Abbasi, Arshad M. 2012. “The Arab World: Democratization and Islamization?” International
Journal on World Peace 29 (1): 7–19.
ACW. 2018. Share of respondents who believe that democracy is incompatible with Islam in the
Middle East and North Africa between 2017 and 2018, by agreement level [Graph]. In
Statista. Retrieved April 13, 2021, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/901901/menashare-of-respondents-who-believe-that-democracy-is-incompatible-with-islam-byagreement-level/
Ahsan, Syed Aziz-al. 1984. "Economic Policy and Class Structure in Syria: 1958-1980."
International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (3): 301-23.
Aksu Kargin, Inci. 2018. “The Unending Arab Spring in Syria: The Primary Dynamics of the
Syrian Civil War as Experienced by Syrian Refugees.” Electronic Turkish Studies 13 (2):
27–48.
Almond G and Verba S. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.
Anderson, Lisa. 1995. “Peace and Democracy in the Middle East: The Constraints of Soft
Budgets.” Journal of International Affairs 49 (1): 25.
Apperley, Alan. 1999. “Hobbes On Democracy.” Politics 19 (3): 165.
Barth, F. Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan. Oslo: Brodrene Jorgensen
A/S, 1953.
Belge, Ceren, and Ekrem Karakoç. 2015. “Minorities in the Middle East: Ethnicity, Religion,
and Support for Authoritarianism.” Political Research Quarterly 68 (2): 280–92.
Ben, Meir, Alon. 2006. “Democracy of Convenience?” Peace Review 18 (2): 269–73.
79

Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. 2006. “QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: Recent
Developments in Case Study Methods.” Annual Review of Political Science 9, no. 1 (6):
455–76.
Browne, Craig. 2009. “Democracy, Religion and Revolution.” Thesis Eleven 99 (1): 27–47.
Bou Nassif, Hicham. 2020. “Turbulent from the Start: Revisiting Military Politics in Pre-Baʿth
Syria.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 52 (3): 469–88.
Charrad, M. 2011. “Central and Local Patrimonialism: State-Building in Kin-Based Societies.”
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636: 49–68.
Celso, Anthony N. 2017. “Hama’s Ominous Shadow and the Stalled Jihadist War in Syria.”
Mediterranean Quarterly 28 (1): 82–98.
Chumakov, A. N. 2014. “Colonialism.” Value Inquiry Book Series 276 (8): 85.
Collelo, Thomas. Syria, a Country Study. District of Columbia: Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress, 1988.
Dajani, Omar M. 2015. “The Middle East’s Majority Problems: Minoritarian Regimes and the
Threat of Democracy.” Ethnic & Racial Studies 38 (14): 2516–33.
Dalton, Russell J. 2008. “Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation.”
Political Studies 56 (1): 76–98.
Eldar, Dan. 1993. “France in Syria: The Abolition of the Sharifian Government, April-July
1920.” Middle Eastern Studies 29 (3): 487.
Epstein, Richard A. 2011. “Direct Democracy: Government of the People, by the People, and for
the People?” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 34 (4): 819–26.
Farouk-Alli, Aslam. 2014. “Sectarianism in Alawi Syria: Exploring the Paradoxes of Politics and
Religion.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 34 (3): 207–26.

80

Fildis, Ayse Tekdal. 2011. “The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by French Divide and Rule.”
Middle East Policy 18 (4): 129–39.
Fleming, Bruce. 2004. “Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?” Parameters:
U.S. Army War College 34 (1): 62–76.
George, L. Alexander and Andrew Bennett. “Phase One: Designing Case Study Research.” In
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press,
2005.
Gerring, John. 2004. “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” The American Political
Science Review 98 (2): 341-354.
Grainger, John D. Syria: an Outline History. Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword History, 2016.
Grant L. Warren. A Constitutional Crisis. Bloomington, IN: WestBow Press, 2013.
Haritz, A. Business processes: an archival science approach to collaborative decision making,
records, and knowledge management. Dordrecht, Germany: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2004.
Inglehart R. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in
43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Inglehart R . Culture and democracy. In: Harrison LE and Huntington S (eds) Culture Matters:
How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
Jabar, F.A. and Hosham Dawod. Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle
East. London: Saqi, 2003.
Johnson, Robert. 2018. “The de Bunsen Committee and a Revision of the ‘Conspiracy’ of SykesPicot.” Middle Eastern Studies 54 (4): 611–37.

81

Karčić, Hamza. 2020. “Sèvres at 100: The Peace Treaty That Partitioned the Ottoman Empire.”
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 40 (3): 470–79.
Karaman, Fikriye. 2018. “The Great War in the Middle East.” Insight Turkey 20 (4): 273–81.
Kirsch, Helen, and Christian Welzel. 2019. “Democracy Misunderstood: Authoritarian Notions
of Democracy around the Globe.” Social Forces 98 (1): 59–92.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.”
Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51.
Lentz, C. 1995. “Tribalism” and Ethnicity in Africa: A Review of Four Decades of Anglophone
Research.” Cahiers des Sciences Humaines 31: 303–28.
Lipset SM. 1959. “Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political
legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53 (1): 69–105.
Magstadt, T. M. Understanding politics: ideas, institutions, and issues (9th ed.). New York, NY:
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011.
Mather, Yassamine. 2014. “The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and Current Conflict in the Middle
East.” Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory 42 (3): 471–85.
Mir, Salam. 2019. “Colonialism, Postcolonialism, Globalization, and Arab Culture.” Arab
Studies Quarterly 41 (1): 33–58.
Mishler W and Rose R. 2001. Political support for incomplete democracies: Realist vs. idealist
theories and measures. International Political Science Review 22 (4): 303–320.
Neep, Daniel. 2013. “The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of
Community in French Mandate Syria - By Benjamin Thomas White.” Political Studies
Review 11 (1): 147.

82

Okon, Enoch Ndem, and Victor Ojakorotu. 2018. “Imperialism and Contemporary Africa: An
Analysis of Continuity and Change.” Journal of African Foreign Affairs 5 (2): 227–49.
Peters, B. G. The politics of bureaucracy (5th ed.). London, UK: Routledge, 2001.
Pföstl, Eva, and Will Kymlicka. 2015. “Minority Politics in the Middle East and North Africa:
The Prospects for Transformative Change.” Ethnic & Racial Studies 38 (14): 2489–98.
Phillips, Christopher. 2017. “Eyes Bigger than Stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in
Syria.” Middle East Policy 24 (1): 36–47.
Ratulea, Gabriela. 2009. “Minorities Protection, Democracy and Cultural Pluralism.” Bulletin of
the Transilvania University of Brasov. Series VII: Social Sciences. Law 1 (51): 42–51.
Rose R. 1997. “Where are postcommunist countries going?.” Journal of Democracy 8 (3): 92–
108.
Rubio, Marco. 2020. “Why Protests Matter: The Battle between Authoritarianism and
Democracy, a War We Must Win.” Journal of International Affairs 73 (2): 251–60.
Sadowski, Yahya. 1991. “Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba`thist Syria: Army,
Party, and Peasant (Book).” Middle East Journal 45 (2): 341.
Seawright, Jason and John Gerring. 2008. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research:
A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.” Political Research Quarterly 61 (2):
294-308.
Seth, Vanita. 2001. “Self and Similitude: Translating Difference (Modern Colonialism and
Renaissance Conquests).” Postcolonial Studies 4 (3): 297–309.
Smith, Leonard V. 2016. “Drawing Borders in the Middle East after the Great War: Political
Geography and ‘Subject Peoples.’” First World War Studies 7 (1): 5–21.

83

Spitz, Elaine. 1979. “Defining Democracy: A Nonecumenical Reply to May.” Political Studies
27 (1): 126–28.
Sterling, Joe. “Daraa: The spark that lit the Syrian flame.” CNN, Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc., 2012. Accessed February 17,2021.
https://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis-beginnings/index.html.
Tapper, R. The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. London: Croom Helm, 1983.
Vlas, Natalia, and Sergiu Gherghina. 2012. “Where Does Religion Meet Democracy? A
Comparative Analysis of Attitudes in Europe.” International Political Science Review 33
(3): 336–51.
Voegelin, E., & Caringella, P. Published Essays 1953-1965: Columbia, MO: University of
Missouri, 1989.
Watson, Brenda. 2011. “Democracy, Religion and Secularism: Reflections on the Public Role of
Religion in a Modern Society.” Journal of Beliefs & Values: Studies in Religion &
Education 32 (2): 173–83.
Weber M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1958.
White, Benjamin Thomas. " In the Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of
Community in French Mandate Syria. George Square, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2011.
White, Benjamin Thomas. 2017. “Refugees and the Definition of Syria, 1920-1939.” Past &
Present 235 (1): 141–78.
Wreen, Michael. 2019. “Moral Relativism and Majority Rule.” Metaphilosophy 50 (3): 361–76.

84

Zachs, Fruma. 2012. “Transformations of a Memory of Tyranny in Syria: From Jamal Pasha to
‘Id Al-Shuhada’ , 1914–2000.” Middle Eastern Studies 48 (1): 73–88.

85

